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Past history and recent intelligence have shown that New York City (NYC), a 
critical node of the U.S. economy, is clearly in the terrorist’s crosshairs. In order to 
reduce the probability, lessen the risk, and minimize the consequences of a Radiological 
Dispersion Device (RDD), or “dirty bomb,” attack, NYC’s first responders must be 
adequately prepared for its seemingly inevitable occurrence. This particular type of attack 
on NYC has the potential to create immense panic and confusion on behalf of the general 
public. Adding to the complexity of the problem is the notion that, since 9/11, the 
expected actions taken by employees in NYC high-rise office buildings in response to 
shelter-in-place instructions can be extremely difficult to predict. Therefore, a proposed 
public awareness campaign and a shelter-in-place plan are two cost-effective and easily 
implemented terrorism preparedness programs that would build the confidence and 
increase the capability of the citizenry. Since an RDD incident would likely result in a 
major inter-agency emergency operation, the unification of command, control, and 
coordination among NYC’s first responder community is an essential element to its 
overall success. Hence, an informed and collaborative response by both public and 
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Is NYC adequately prepared for a “dirty bomb” attack? An examination of the 
current research on this topic suggests that the overarching problem can be analyzed 
incrementally. This thesis answers this relatively broad question in the ensuing chapters 
by critically assessing the following prevention, preparedness, and response measures 
from the perspective of a NYC first responder. First, it analyzes the current trend of 
terrorism and its implications in order to make an adequate threat and vulnerability 
assessment for NYC’s first responder agencies. Second, it investigates the radiation 
detection technology initiatives used for RDD prevention and response while 
recommending steps to be taken to improve upon notable deficiencies. Third, it studies 
the significance of a public awareness campaign with regard to this catastrophic, yet 
manageable, type of incident and offers a pragmatic plan for fear management. Fourth, it 
explores the practicability of a shelter-in-place plan for NYC, the borough of Manhattan 
in particular, and advocates the development of a collaborative response plan. Fifth, it 
confronts the strong points and limitations in the collaborative effort put forth by NYC’s 
public sector entities with regard to emergency response and incident management and 
makes suggestions for best practices. The strategic plan put forth in the final chapter of 
this thesis is available for implementation by senior NYC public safety officials, on either 


























A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), or “dirty bomb,” attack is sometimes 
referred to by terrorism experts as the type of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
event most likely to occur in the United States (U.S.).1 Meanwhile, it is also widely 
accepted that New York City (NYC) is at or near the top of the list of potential terrorist 
targets. Fortunately, NYC public officials realize the magnitude of this looming threat, 
and have accomplished much in the way of preparing for its occurrence; but much more 
still remains to be done. Since 9/11, many counter-terrorism measures have been taken in 
NYC with respect to equipment, technology, and capability.2 These accomplishments are 
extremely important first steps; realistic training and planning is needed, however, to 
achieve a level of preparedness that looks as good in practice as it does on paper. In 
particular, new and existing strategies must be implemented to increase the readiness of 
NYC’s public and private sectors to respond safely and efficiently to an RDD attack. 
Past history and recent intelligence have shown that NYC, a critical node of the 
U.S. economy, is clearly in the terrorist’s crosshairs.3 In order to reduce the probability, 
lessen the risk, and minimize the consequences of a RDD, NYC’s first responders must 
be adequately prepared for its seemingly inevitable occurrence. This particular type of 
attack on NYC has the potential to create immense panic and confusion on behalf of the 
general public. Adding to the complexity of the problem is the notion that, since 9/11, the 
expected actions taken by employees in NYC high-rise office buildings in response to 
shelter-in-place instructions can be extremely difficult to predict. Therefore, a proposed 
                                                 
1 In his article, Keller states: “That is why, if you polled the universe of people paid to worry about 
weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D., in the jargon), you would find a general agreement that this is 
probably the first thing we'll see. ‘If there is a W.M.D. attack in the next year, it's likely to be a radiological 
attack,' said Rose Gottemoeller, who handled Russian nuclear safety in the Clinton administration and now 
follows the subject for the Carnegie Endowment.” Bill Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares,” New York Times 
Magazine, May 26, 2002, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20D15FB3E5C0C758EDDAC0894DA404482 (accessed 
January 19, 2006). 
2 For example, see Nicholas Scoppetta (FDNY Commissioner), in testimony to the 9/11 Commission 
panel, May 18, 2004. 
3 For example, see Michael Bloomberg (NYC Mayor), in testimony to the 9/11 Commission panel, 
May 19, 2004. 
2 
public awareness campaign and a shelter-in-place plan are two cost-effective and easily 
implemented terrorism preparedness programs that would build the confidence and 
increase the capability of the citizenry. Since an RDD incident would likely result in a 
major inter-agency emergency operation, the unification of command, control, and 
coordination among NYC’s first responder community is an essential element to its 
overall success. Hence, an informed and collaborative response by both public and 
private sector entities could potentially reduce casualties and save lives. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although the concern about the modern terrorist use of WMD has been around for 
more than a decade, the concept of RDD in particular has only recently reached its 
heightened level of attention since 9/11. It is also important to note that a terrorist attack 
resulting in an actual “dirty bomb” explosion has not yet taken place anywhere in the 
world. Hence, the relevant literature on the topic is still relatively young. Fortunately, the 
current work found in scientific research reports, scholarly books and journals, and 
various periodicals is generally reliable and sufficiently comprehensive. The research by 
prominent terrorism authorities on the WMD threat in general, and to NYC specifically, 
is equally substantive and pertinent. Whereas universal information on public awareness 
of a WMD attack is readily available from internet sources, there exists no known public 
record of shelter-in-place strategies for major metropolitan areas. The spoken testimony 
of top local officials and emergency response experts at a pivotal public safety hearing 
offers credible insight into the current situation between NYC’s two main first responder 
agencies. These on-the-record statements are especially valuable when leveraged against 
the findings of locally and federally mandated post-9/11 initiatives and recommendations 
on the framework of emergency preparedness and incident management. 
Over the past roughly twelve years, NYC has been the target of two successful 
terrorist attacks and numerous other failed attempts. Using this recent history as a presage 
of future events, certain conclusions can be drawn on the likelihood of an RDD attack. 
The works of notable terrorism experts Bruce Hoffman and John Parachini are useful in 
establishing an overview of the threat to the U.S., and to NYC in particular. For his part, 
Hoffman offers intriguing insight into the type of group or non-group most likely to be 
responsible for the next attack, whether the attack will be either secular or religiously 
3 
motivated, and the terrorist’s penchant to inflict damage on the US economy.4 
Conversely, by suggesting that the bulk of counter-terrorism funding be allocated to 
preventive measures at the expense of first responder preparedness, Parachini seemingly 
discounts the likelihood of a WMD attack.5 Based upon the work of these authors, and 
other related findings, general inferences may be made about the urgency of the threat. 
In order to fully comprehend the challenges presented by a radiological attack, it 
is necessary to identify the possibility and consequences of its occurrence. In a New York 
Times article entitled “Nuclear Nightmares,” Bill Keller asserts that the likelihood of 
attacks could be classified into two distinct categories: an unlikely but vastly devastating 
nuclear explosion; and the more probable but still chaotic “dirty bomb” attack.6 The 
detailed discussion convincingly builds a case for the potentiality of nuclear materials, 
obtained from Russia and surrounding countries, getting into the hands of terrorists.  He 
cites an important study conducted by Henry Kelly of the Federation of American 
Scientists (FAS) that uncovers the short and long term physical and psychological 
damage caused by such an occurrence.7 Unlike the FAS report, however, Keller’s 
commentary does not address whether a successful, measured response plan could prove 
to be a sufficient deterrent. 
Any in-depth analysis conducted on a nuclear terrorist attack or, more 
specifically, an RDD event, should include the work of Charles D. Ferguson and William 
C. Potter and their book, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism.8 This recently updated 
compilation of nuclear terrorism research focuses on the threat of an RDD event as one of 
the “faces” and, as such, may be considered the standard by which all related studies are 
                                                 
4 Bruce Hoffman, Testimony: Lessons of 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, October 2002), 13-15, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT201.pdf (accessed February 21, 2006); Inside Terrorism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 92; and Al-Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future 
Potentialities: An Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 11, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2005/P8078.pdf (accessed February 21, 2006). 
5 John V. Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism in Perspective,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 
(Autumn 2003): 48.  
6 Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares.”  
7 Henry Kelly, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 6, 2002, 
Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/030602-kellytestimony.htm (accessed 
January 19, 2006). 
8 Charles D. Ferguson and others, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, CA: Monterey 
Institute for International Studies, 2004), 259-317. 
4 
measured. In one of the opening chapters, the authors reaffirm the findings made by 
Hoffman regarding the type of groups most likely to commit nuclear attacks.9 They 
uphold Keller’s assessment of the RDD threat, but in a more comprehensive manner. 
Their inquiry provides recommendations for preventing and responding to these potential 
attacks, including such measures as public education and first responder training. Most 
importantly, despite offering ideas on how to enforce the nonproliferation of radiological 
materials, they maintain that “…reducing the probability of a terrorist incident may be a 
less effective risk-reduction strategy in the short term than seeking to mitigate the 
consequences of an RDD attack, an event that must be considered highly likely to occur 
in coming years.”10 Hence, with the exception of the definitive shelter-in-place strategy 
emphasized in a recent New York Academy of Medicine survey, Ferguson and Potter offer 
useful and realistic insight into the RDD preparedness issues, and the underlying 
strategies, outlined and proposed in this thesis. 
Short of the impossible task of successfully accounting and controlling for all 
sources of radiological material, perhaps the most effective means for deterring an RDD 
attack is to bolster a jurisdiction’s prevention and response capabilities with the 
installation of a comprehensive radiation detection system. In a 2004 Physics Today 
article entitled “Detecting Illicit Radiological Sources,” Joseph McDonald provides an 
investigatory report into the various types of radiation detection technology currently 
available for homeland security application, including the devices used by first 
responders.11 His research revolves around an in-depth practical analysis of the most 
cutting-edge technology; therefore, it comes across as primarily a highly-scientific report 
on the technical operation of the most commonly used devices. However, he does provide 
some interesting insight into the advantages and shortcomings of each, and offers realistic 
advice for the future development and acquisition of new technology.  It is important to 
note that all of the devices he refers to in this article are currently being utilized by NYC 
first responder agencies. 
                                                 
9 Ferguson, Four Faces, 18-20. 
10 Ibid., 11. 
11 Joseph C. McDonald, Bert M. Coursey and Michael Carter, “Detecting Illicit Radiological 
Sources,” Physics Today (November 2004): 36, http://homeland-security.pnl.gov/pdf/raddetectors-
physics_today_nov_04.pdf (accessed January 19, 2006). 
5 
In a presentation to the New York Area Science and Technology Workgroup in 
December, 2004, Dr. Lawrence Ruth from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) in NYC briefed a multi-agency 
group of local emergency management personnel on the status of a proposed NYC 
Incident Management Radiological Monitoring Network.12 This “for official use only” 
document provides useful insight into the proposed system that was scheduled to be 
unveiled for pilot testing in March, 2005. The plan, which was devised in collaboration 
with NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM), focuses on building a detection 
network in and around NYC, with the initial emphasis placed upon protecting the 
financial institutions and transportation hubs in the “defense zone” south of 59th St. in the 
borough of Manhattan. The recommended concept of operations identifies the roles and 
responsibilities of multi-agency partners, and the plan’s coordination with other ongoing 
radiological initiatives as significant challenges that must be overcome. Undoubtedly, 
these issues are of concern given the findings of the DHS “playbooks” project and the 
recently released Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) protocol. Despite this 
recently implemented effort, however, a 2004 Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
report finds, “Detecting RDDs, though, is not simple… [And the] difficulty of finding 
RDD material emphasizes the value of eliminating or securing it.”13 
According to a Cato Institute policy analysis, emergency preparedness is 
contingent upon gaining public support through an education and information 
campaign.14 More specifically, the aforementioned CRS report advocates a “large-scale 
public education program” as a possible solution to reduce the consequences of an RDD 
attack.15 Coincidentally, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also 
recommends heightened public awareness for terrorist attacks, including those involving 
                                                 
12 The information regarding this program was obtained from a power-point presentation posted on a 
secure Web site restricted for use by the New York Area Science and Technology Workgroup. Up-to-date, 
de-classified information on this topic for the purposes of this thesis was provided by Lawrence Ruth, PhD. 
(DHS Environmental Measurements Laboratory), interview by author, May 25, 2005. 
13 Jonathan Medalia, “Terrorist ‘Dirty Bombs’: A Brief Primer,” Congressional Research Service 
(April 1, 2004): 6. 
14 Eric R. Taylor, “Are We Prepared for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Cato 
Institute: Policy Analysis, no. 387 (November 27, 2000): 15, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa387.pdf 
(accessed January 19, 2006). 
15 Medalia, “Terrorist ‘Dirty Bombs’,” 6. 
6 
an RDD, and has developed a set of specific guidelines for the uninformed citizen to 
follow.16 These basic and easily understandable procedures are readily available on the 
FEMA Web site. Similarly, the RAND Corporation offers a comprehensive and user-
friendly instruction manual that supplements the FEMA terrorism awareness 
information.17 Included with this report is a handy “reference card” that consolidates the 
key points and instructions into an easily accessible pamphlet. Hence, the fundamental 
first step in RDD preparedness is to propose a concerted and formalized effort to 
mainstream these crucial recommendations in order to change the public’s perception and 
awareness of these types of attacks. 
Whereas the aforementioned New York Times article falls short, RD Lasker excels 
in his research on how the public will perceive and react to a RDD attack.18 In a 
comprehensive study conducted in 2004 for the New York Academy of Medicine, Lasker 
suggests that, according to current plans, only three-fifths of the people told to do so 
would stay in place at a location other than their home. The underlying conclusion 
reached in this report can be best explained thus: “The public’s full cooperation in the 
dirty bomb situation could be increased substantially by developing shelter-in-place plans 
in the places people frequently are in and making people very aware of those plans; by 
strengthening people’s confidence in community preparedness plans; and by enhancing 
people’s trust in official instructions and actions.”19 It is worth noting that in the 
hypothesis, specific reference is made to post-9/11 NYC. Although it is difficult to 
discount the applicability of these recommendations, Lasker does not ask the questions: 
Is a shelter-in-place plan in a densely populated area such as NYC entirely feasible? Can 
the unique construction features of high-rise buildings render this strategy ineffective? 
Would the consequences be significantly different if shelter-in-place instructions were 
not given to the occupants of a building in a timely and appropriate manner? Otherwise, 
                                                 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Are You Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen 
Preparedness,” 169-172, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/areyouready/areyouready_full.pdf (accessed January 19, 
2006). 
17 Lynn E. Davis and others, Individual Preparedness Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, 
and Biological Terrorist Attacks: A Quick Guide (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 7-9, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR1731.1.pdf (accessed January 20, 2006). 
18 Roz D. Lasker, “Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public,” The 
New York Academy of Medicine (2004): 31-42. 
19 Ibid., 37. 
7 
this is an extremely useful source of information and should be used as a guide to be 
followed when developing new or re-designed emergency response plans. 
This literature evaluates NYC’s RDD attack preparedness and, as such, may 
contribute significantly to the development of a comprehensive response strategy for 
public and private participants. In order to highlight the importance of this study, general 
assertions are necessarily made by examining current terrorism trends and the probable 
consequences of a successful attack. Conceivably, the deployment of a comprehensive 
detection system and corresponding response plan could prove to be an effective 
preventive measure and a potential deterrent. So that the harmful effects of a successful 
attack are sufficiently limited, a general understanding of the public’s reaction to an RDD 
attack may assist in the development of a realistic and workable evacuation/shelter-in-
place plan. By following the tenets of incident command, the overall efficiency of first 
responders operating at this complex incident is greatly enhanced. Thus, interagency 
coordination and training, particularly between the Fire Department of New York 
(FDNY) and the New York Police Department (NYPD), is a key element in the strategy’s 
overall success. 
C. METHOD 
A critical analysis of the generally recognized threats and vulnerabilities generates 
fundamental conclusions regarding the current trends and future potentialities for NYC. 
Although some important literature is available on the actual and potential measures 
available for countering an RDD attack, its reliability is corroborated through interviews 
with local subject-matter experts. Current research on the psychology of fear and 
terrorism reveals that there are options available to NYC public safety officials for 
increasing public awareness with programs that provide critical emergency response 
instruction prior to and during an actual RDD event. Due to the fact that an RDD attack 
has not yet taken place, there is a relative scarcity of relevant information on the 
practicality of sheltering-in-place during such an event; thus a survey of high-ranking   
NYC public safety officials can offer some insight into the feasibility of this seemingly 
problematic strategy. Finally, an objective professional assessment of recently enacted 
local policies when evaluated against mandated national preparedness strategies will 
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II. THREATS 
A. CURRENT TRENDS IN NYC TERRORISM 
1. Introduction 
Within the realm of homeland security, much attention has been focused on NYC 
being perhaps the greatest target afforded terrorists in the United States. It could be 
argued, however, that other cities, Washington D.C. notwithstanding, possess the same 
lure to terrorist plots as NYC; and thus, receive a disproportionate amount of resources 
for responder preparedness. Yet, time and again, intelligence reports have shown that 
NYC, and the island borough of Manhattan in particular, are clearly in the terrorist 
crosshairs. This often leads critics to wonder, “What makes NYC so attractive for 
terrorists? How severe is the threat?” This chapter will proceed to answer these questions, 
not only to satisfy the inquiries, but also for the benefit of those public safety officials 
seeking information on the direction of the current trend of terrorism in NYC. With this 
information, policymakers from first responder agencies will then be able to better assess 
preparedness, allocate resources, develop plans, and implement strategies. 
2. Recent History 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993 and 2001 are two 
well-documented cases that have been scrutinized by many renowned experts from 
various fields and disciplines. From a rudimentary terrorism standpoint, it appears that 
these two events have some common denominators. First, aside from the obvious fact 
that the attack was leveraged against the same exact building, the most compelling 
general inference to be drawn is that it was a calculated strike against our Nation’s 
economy. Interestingly, in the 1993 attack the location of the building, its physical 
attributes, and a desire to inflict a large number of casualties, were the most prominent 
factors in choosing the target.20  Despite almost $300 million in damage, economic 
fallout was not the prime motivator in the first attempt to topple the towers. 
                                                 
20 John V. Parachini, “The World Trade Center Bombers: 1993,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist 
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker, 185-206 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2000), 189, http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/pdfs/toxter11.pdf (accessed February 13, 2006). 
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Unfortunately, since the 2001 attack, “financial Armageddon” is a theme that al-
Qaeda has clearly adopted. In a citation of British journalist Paul Eedle, terrorism expert 
Bruce Hoffman notes, 
In particular, articles posted on the [al Neda Web] site have sought to draw 
a connection between the destruction of the World Trade Center and the 
cumulative blow struck against the U.S. economy by the September 11 
attacks. Among the claims of proof the site offers are the weakening 
strength of the American dollar, the precipitous decline of the U.S. stock 
market, and the loss of confidence both at home and abroad in the 
American economy.21  
Hoffman also states that continuous rhetoric presented by Osama bin Laden exposes “[the 
U.S.] as  a ‘paper tiger,’ on the verge of financial ruin and total collapse much as the 
USSR once was, with the power of Islam poised similarly to push America over the 
precipice.”22 Most importantly, however, is bin Laden’s own words to his devout 
followers in 2001, in which he states, 
America is in retreat by the grace of God Almighty and economic attrition 
is continuing up to today. But it needs further blows. The young men need 
to seek out the nodes of the American economy and strike the enemy’s 
nodes.23  
Additionally, as recent as August, 2004, a heightened level of alert was issued for 
Manhattan’s Citicorp Center and the New York Stock Exchange, with intelligence 
pointing toward a possible al-Qaeda attack at these financial institutions.24 Thus, a new 
battle-hymn has been sounded for the cadre of al-Qaeda loyalists and sympathizers, 
suggesting a trend toward further attacks on U.S. financial centers. 
A second consideration worth noting is the audacity of al-Qaeda striking not only 
in the same city but at the exact same building.  Certainly, other major cities in the U.S. 
have high-rise buildings tall enough to have been easily penetrated by commercial 
airliners. Also, the calculated amount of WTC casualties could not have been estimated 
as significantly greater than in another building and/or city. This leads one to ask, “Why 
                                                 
21 Hoffman, Al-Qaeda, 11. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., translated by Eedle to Hoffman via personal communication, July 31, 2002. 
24 Greg Gittrich, “Al Qaeda Plot Targets Us,” Daily News, August 2, 2004, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/218255p-187749c.html (accessed January 3, 2005). 
11 
hit the WTC again after the first attempt to bring it down had failed?” In reference to 
predictions of future attacks on Washington, D.C. made by some Bush administration, 
law enforcement, and intelligence officials, Hoffman explains that, “Al Qaeda’s penchant 
to return to targets that previous attacks had failed to destroy consumed these experts’ 
thoughts and therefore they viewed the White House and U.S. Capitol as at the top of the 
terrorists’ hit list.”25 Perhaps it could be argued that the subsequent media exposure 
regarding the construction of the building provided bin-Laden with vital information on 
its design flaws, and thus, created the impetus for the repeat performance. More likely the 
case, however, is the broadly accepted premise that al-Qaeda will persistently and 
patiently attempt to exploit specific high-value targets, whenever possible, so that 
maximum exposure is attained. 
The type of methods used to deliver the two destructive strikes is a third factor 
worthy of distinction. The 1993 attempt, featuring a van containing approximately 1500 
pounds of urea-nitrate explosives detonated a sub-level parking garage, pales in 
comparison to the jet-fuel laden commercial airplanes used in the 2001 episode. 
Incidentally, a 1993 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report on terrorist acts finds 
that, “Due to the loss of human life, serious bodily injuries, extensive property damage, 
and economic loss, the bombing of the WTC is considered to be the single largest 
international terrorist incident ever conducted in the United States.”26 Was bin-Laden’s 
own hubris and omnipotence as the ultimate leader of the jihad movement the likely 
motive for the second and more spectacular NYC attack? If so, any future al-Qaeda 
attack in the U.S. could be expected to be at least as devastating as the last and, once 
again, may include NYC as a key recipient. 
It is helpful to perform a cursory examination of the relatively recent and 
unsuccessful terrorist plots in NYC in order to establish a baseline modus operandi. The 
following past failed attempts are listed in chronological order: 
• In 1995, Abd al-Rahman, otherwise known as the “Blind Shiek,” was 
convicted not only for the 1993 WTC attack but also for planning to bomb 
                                                 
25 Hoffman, Al-Qaeda, 1. 
26 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States: 1993, 
2, http://www.mipt.org/pdf/TerrorismInUS1993.pdf (accessed January 19, 2006). 
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the United Nations, the FBI building, the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, 
and other NYC landmarks. According to a published U.S. State 
Department report, “Trial evidence showed that Abd al-Rahman was the 
leader of an organization whose aim was to wage a self-styled ‘holy war’ 
of terror against the United States because he considered it an enemy of 
Islam.”27 
• In 1997, in a raid based on a tip-off of a planned subway bombing, Gazi 
Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil were shot and wounded by NYPD 
officers in their Brooklyn apartment.28 Although a letter sent to the U.S. 
State Department shortly before their arrest called for the release of six 
Arabs from U.S. and Israeli jails, it could not be proven that the two were 
affiliated with a particular group. 
• In 2003, two al-Qaeda plots to strike NYC were uncovered and 
thwarted.29 In one instance, the alleged terrorist operatives infiltrated a 
Manhattan Garment Center business in an attempted plot to smuggle 
weapons via a ship container from Pakistan. In the other scheme, the 
perpetrators were conducting surveillance operations on the Brooklyn 
Bridge with the apparent intent of planning its demise. 
• In August, 2004, two NYC natives were arrested for planning to blow up 
the 34 St. subway station in the heart of Manhattan’s Herald Square.30 The 
two friends had no known ties with al-Qaeda or any other organization, 
prompting one NYPD official to classify it as a “homegrown, lone-wolf 
incident.”31 
                                                 
27 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995 (1996): 2, 
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/1995pogt.pdf (accessed January 3, 2005). 
28 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Terrorism in the United States: 
1997,” 5, http://www.mipt.org/pdf/TerrorismInUS1997.pdf (accessed January 19, 2006). 
29 Raymond Kelly (NYPD Commissioner), in testimony to the 9/11 Commission panel, May 18, 2004. 
30 Craig Horowitz, “Anatomy of a Foiled Plot,” New York Magazine, December 6, 2004, 
http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/features/10559/index.html (accessed January 19, 2006). 
31 Ibid. 
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Hence, over approximately the past twelve years, there exists a commonality 
regarding these plots. All of the attempts involved either Islamic fundamentalists or those 
sympathetic to the cause. In each case, the pattern of attack points to the use of bombs at 
various symbolic and transportation sites, including two intended for the subway system. 
Moreover, three out of the five failed efforts can be linked to organized terrorist groups. 
3. Types of Terrorist Groups 
Based upon the aforementioned information, it is possible to establish a general 
overview of the type of group, or non-group with ideological affiliation, that could 
potentially be responsible for the next NYC attack. Obviously, the general trend points 
toward a future attack involving participants that share Islamic fundamentalist views. On 
the other hand, it cannot be predicted with any reasonable degree of certainty whether it 
will include dedicated members of an organized group (the foiled 1995 and two 2003 
plots, and the 2001 attack), or the “lone-wolf” type individuals (the 1997 and 2004 plots). 
Regarding the current threat for prospective attacks presented by al-Qaeda, Hoffman 
suggests terrorists could be otherwise classified by one of the following four types:32 
• The professional cadre. Well trained, and dedicated members trusted with 
surveillance and funding for the “highest value” missions. The 19 
hijackers in the 2001 attack clearly match this criterion. 
• The trained amateurs. Less professional due to lack of training, however 
still considered dangerous in the event a successful attack. The failed 
airline “shoe-bomber” Richard Reid is one such example of this type of 
operative. 
• The local walk-ins. Local Islamic groups and loosely tied affiliates that 
propose plans for attack in an attempt to obtain financial assistance from 
al-Qaeda. 
• Like-minded insurgents, guerillas and terrorists. “[I]nsurgent or terrorist 
groups who over the years have benefited from bin Laden’s largesse  
 
 
                                                 
32 Hoffman, Lessons of 9/11, 13-15. 
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and/or spiritual guidance; received training in Afghanistan from al-Qa’ida; 
or have been provided with arms, materiel and other assistance by 
organization.”33 
Consequently, any future NYC attack could be largely based upon an Islamic 
fundamentalist ideology but, the type of potential perpetrator may run the gamut from the 
consummate professional to the initiated walk-in amateur. 
The nature of the next attack could be predicted by determining whether the 
attack is religiously or politically motivated. For example, the 1997 failed plot by  the 
unaffiliated team of abu Mezer and Khalil seemingly upholds David C. Rapoport’s 
argument, “Most observers of Islam know that [terrorism] fuses religion and politics in 
ways unparalleled in other major religions, a fact reflected in Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
constantly re-iterated phrase that ‘politics and religion are one.’”34 Meanwhile, the attack 
perpetrated by the “Blind Shiek” on the WTC in 1993 supports the theory that the more 
serious terrorist attacks, in terms of casualties or politics, have shown religion as a prime 
motivator.35 Hence, based solely upon the fact that the 1993 and 2001 WTC attacks were 
more successful and damaging than either the 1997 and 2004 failed subway plots, it 
appears that purely religious-inspired and organized groups are more professional and 
thus, extremely dangerous. However, the lethal potential of the less structured political 
and religiously motivated individuals, or local walk-ins, should not be underestimated. It 
could be only a matter of time before pay dirt is hit. 
4. Types of Attacks of Greatest Concern 
It is the profound belief of one top NYC public safety official that the next attack 
could be at the hands of a “suicide bomber.”36 In his opinion, several suicide attacks 
occurring a few days apart in the transportation hubs of Penn Station, Grand Central 
Station, and the subway system would psychologically cripple the general public. 
                                                 
33 Hoffman, Lessons of 9/11, 13-15. 
34 David C. Rapoport, “Perceptions and Misperceptions of Religious Terror,” unedited paper 
contributed to the International Conference on Countering Terrorism through Enhanced International 
Cooperation, 4.  
35 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 92.  
36 Harold Meyers (FDNY Manhattan Borough Command Chief), personal conversation with author, 
December 31, 2004. 
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Lending support to this conjecture, Dr. Irwin Redlener from the Columbia University 
Center for Disaster Preparedness expects an event similar to the Madrid train bombings 
to take place in Penn Station.37 Coincidentally, in a recent dissertation, Scott Atran states, 
“…terrorists are becoming increasingly effective by using suicide attacks, and the trend 
points to a catastrophic unconventional terrorist attack that could make the March 11 
attacks in Madrid and the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington pale in 
comparison.”38 
Contrary to this “suicide bomber” estimation, however, is the basic argument that 
these types of attacks have not yet materialized in NYC. Hence, it is the viewpoint of at 
least one U.S. intelligence specialist that a potential suicide terrorist experiencing social 
exposure to American people inherently becomes more comfortable with his 
surroundings, thus decreasing his desire to follow through with a suicide attack.39 
Apparently lending support to this theory, it is suggested that the 19 hijackers on 9/11 
were able to sufficiently isolate themselves with frequent and unrestricted travel; 
therefore, effectively breaking any emotional ties with society. 
It is important to note that, although not well-known or publicized, a terrorist 
suicide attack has already taken place in NYC. In 1997, at the Empire State Building, a 
Palestinian man shot and killed one man, injured several others, and then turned the gun 
on himself. An apparent suicide note found in the killer’s possession pointed to the 
"enemies of Palestine" as the reason for the attack.40 Thus, it can be surmised that a 
suicide attack is well within the realm of would-be terrorists in NYC. The cohesiveness 
and sustainability of such occurrences, however, remains somewhat uncertain. 
Since 9/11, much attention has been focused on local preparedness for an attack 
involving WMD. As a direct result of the lessons learned on that one particular day, first 
responder agencies have been the recipients of a major influx in federal funding. The 
                                                 
37 Christopher McDougall, “Reasons They Haven’t Hit Us Again,” New York Magazine, December 6, 
2004, http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/features/10560/index.html (accessed January 19, 2006). 
38 Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 
2004): 70. 
39 McDougall, “Reasons They Haven’t Hit Us.” 
40 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997 (1998), under 1997 Global 
Terrorism: The Year in Review, http://www.mipt.org/pdf/1997pogt.pdf (accessed January 19, 2006). 
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intended use of these grants is to enhance and increase the capability and expertise of ill-
equipped organizations to respond to such events. For example, in 2004 alone, the FDNY 
had completed training for 46 technically enhanced and specialized hazardous materials 
units in preparation for a potential WMD attack.41 Additionally, new equipment, 
including a “state-of-the-art” mobile command center and chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-rated self-contained breathing apparatus, has been 
introduced to further augment the Department’s ability to operate at these incidents 
effectively and safely. Surprisingly, John V. Parachini, a notable policy analyst at RAND, 
seemingly disagrees with the formula of increasing spending for first responder WMD 
preparedness at the expense of law enforcement, intelligence, border patrol, diplomacy 
and military action.42 In an attempt to dispel this line of reasoning one may ask, “How 
likely is it that a WMD attack will occur in NYC?” 
In building his WMD argument Parachini states, “More than anything else…the 
mindset of leadership, opportunity and technical capacity are the factor’s that most 
significantly influence a [terrorist] group’s propensity to seek, to acquire and to use 
unconventional weapons.”43 In his analysis of each factor he primarily takes a stand 
against the eventuality of a WMD attack, claiming that historically there exists no proof 
of relative success. However, Parachini’s effort pre-dates the recent public announcement 
by a former Central Intelligence Agency officer of the 2003 fatwa, issued by the well-
known Islamic cleric Sheik Nasir bin Hamid al Fahd, permitting the use WMD as a 
means of attack.44  Hence, it would be imprudent to disregard the “obsessive” mindset of 
the al-Qaeda leadership evident in this important religious ruling. 
Recent data obtained from military operations in Afghanistan supports the popular 
belief that al-Qaeda has persistently tried to acquire materials for the development of 
biological and radiological weapons.45 Moreover, the opportunity needed to obtain 
                                                 
41 New York City Fire Department, “Commissioner’s Message,” Department Order No.1, Supp. No.1, 
January 4, 2005. 
42 Parachini, “WMD Terrorism,” 48. 
43 Ibid., 42. 
44 Kelly Uphoff, “Osama bin Laden’s Mandate for Nuclear Terror,” JINSA Online (December 10, 
2004), http://www.jinsa.org/articles/print.html/documentid/2762 (accessed January 19, 2006). 
45 Steve Bowman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat,” Congressional Research 
Service (March 7, 2002): 3. 
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material for unconventional weapons is not beyond the imagination or means of even a 
small group of terrorists. In a New York Times article entitled “Nuclear Nightmares,” 
author Bill Keller explains that cobalt-60, a radioactive material that could potentially be 
used in a dirty bomb, is commonly found in hospitals and food irradiation plants.46 
Regarding the technical capacity needed to disperse this substance, Keller cites an FAS 
deposition outlining the catastrophic effects of this easily improvised homemade 
device.47 
In assessing the realistic threat of a WMD terrorist attack, Parachini gets it right 
when he states, “Al-Qaeda…continues to be interested in [WMD] but is also willing and 
able to conduct significant, multiple, and near simultaneous attacks with conventional 
means.”48  Generally speaking, this assessment holds true; however, in NYC the threat of 
a WMD attack cannot be downplayed. To suggest that any significant effort made toward 
increasing preparedness be undermined for the sake of marginal economic efficiency is 
irrational given the severe consequences of such events. 
5. Conclusion 
The nature of terrorism is conceptually too dynamic, complex, and sophisticated 
to expound on many explicit assumptions. However, it can be beneficial to closely 
examine current trends in order to create an adequate level awareness and preparedness 
that is critically needed in NYC. Hence, it is entirely feasible to rely on the following 
conclusions: 
• Any large scale attack could reasonably be expected to involve the 
Financial District in lower Manhattan. With hundreds of financial firms 
encompassing all aspects of the industry, it is arguably the most valuable 
“node of the American economy” worth protecting. On any given business 
day, a few hundred thousand employees inhabit a relatively small 
                                                 
46 Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares.” 
47 While Keller points out that the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) testimony before Congress 
suggests the detonation of a homemade dirty bomb in the area of Lower Manhattan would have disastrous 
consequences, the FAS estimation is perceived by some as being overly pessimistic. See, for example, F. T. 
Harper, S. V. Musolino and W. Wente, “Realistic Radiological Dispersal Device Hazard Boundaries and 
Ramifications for Early Consequence Management Decisions,” International Journal of Risk Assessment 
and Management (forthcoming). 
48 Parachini, “WMD Terrorism,” 46. 
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cavernous, high-rise building area of less than one square mile. This area 
has previously been the recipient of two relatively catastrophic attacks; 
and it remains an extremely susceptible target for yet another, more 
cataclysmic, strike by the patient and importunate al-Qaeda organization.  
• The type and location of future attacks, in general, may be predicated on 
the category of terrorist involved. A relatively small scale attack by al-
Qaeda could be expected to be at the hands of either trained amateurs or 
local walk-ins. These types have consistently expressed a penchant to 
attack the NYC transportation system in areas within the borough of 
Manhattan. While not as proficient, “lone-wolf” participants sympathetic 
with al-Qaeda can be equally as dangerous and can be expected to be 
successful over time. Also, purely religious actors have been shown to be 
more adept and destructive than their secular-minded counterparts. 
• The specific type of attack will vary depending upon the type of 
participant. Suicide attacks using explosives have not yet occurred and, 
unlike those occurring in the Middle East, the future of such may be 
extremely sporadic. The potential offender is likely to be of either the 
local walk-in or a “lone-wolf” type. 
• The next terrorist strike in NYC will aptly make use of conventional 
explosives to achieve the desired objective. Its relative ease of use by the 
professional and amateur alike, as well as its overall reliability and 
effectiveness, accounts for it continuing to be the weapon of choice. 
Among the list of most likely targets, financial institutions and 
transportation systems remain inclusively at the top. 
• Finally, a terrorist incident employing WMD is another low probability 
event; however, the consequences could be extremely high. Hence, first 
responder agencies should continue to make in-roads in preparedness in 
anticipation of its inevitable occurrence. The al-Qaeda organization is 




A. THE INEVITABLE RDD ATTACK 
1. Introduction 
Given the greater likelihood of future terror attacks involving the use of 
conventional explosives, why then should NYC public safety officials and first 
responders continue to remain focused on preparing for the lower probability WMD 
attack, and more specifically one utilizing an RDD? A plausible explanation is that future 
risk-based funding provided by DHS for first responder equipment and training will be 
funneled in this direction. Also, NYC is arguably the largest stakeholder of business and 
finance infrastructure in the Nation; and terrorists, through their pattern of attacks and 
plots, have shown a willingness to return. Furthermore, the after-effects of 9/11 have 
proven that an attack on this sector will reverberate through the entire U.S. economy. 
Thus, NYC’s emergency response community must do all it can to increase its own 
preparedness in order to minimize the effectiveness of this type of attack. 
2. Risk-based Funding 
In a July, 2005 statement made before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff emphasized the importance 
of concentrating preparedness efforts towards catastrophic attacks.49 In an environment 
of finite resources, he suggests that the U.S. must maximize security by preparing for 
more devastating types of events at the expense of a willingness to accept relatively more 
risk, with potentially lesser consequences, at more vulnerable infrastructure. Specifically, 
he singles out a nuclear attack on U.S. soil as one such event that would be particularly 
catastrophic. Based upon this assessment, the current Administration has proposed that 
Congress should “establish and fund a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to 
develop and deploy the next generation of systems that will allow us to dramatically 
improve our ability to detect and intercept a nuclear threat.”50  In assessing the current 
level of U.S. preparedness for nuclear terrorism, Chertoff notes that, “[some] of the tools 
                                                 
49 Michael Chertoff (U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary), in a statement made before 
the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, July 19, 2005, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Official Web site, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4643 
(accessed October 2, 2005). 
50 Ibid. 
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needed to prevent, respond and recover from such awful scenarios are already in place; 
but others need significant improvement.”51 Fortunately, at the present time, the DNDO 
is actively engaged in developing and deploying radiation detection technologies for the 
NYC area. (An overview of these technologies will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter IV.) 
However, not all resources are expended solely on comprehensive detection 
equipment capabilities. Being fully prepared for a nuclear event also requires a 
substantial investment in first responder training. Over time, the recurring costs 
associated with a robust and ongoing training program could eclipse the fixed expenses 
associated with the procurement and maintenance of equipment. So, why then should 
NYC agencies be willing to spend its own limited resources on any current and/or future 
training programs considering the fact that a terror attack using nuclear or radiological 
weapons has not yet occurred?52 The answer to this question lies in an analysis of the 
threat and potential consequences of a successful RDD attack, especially in the areas of 
Midtown or Lower Manhattan. 
3. Nuclear Terrorism 
In 2002, with the devastating blow delivered on 9/11 still relatively fresh in the 
minds of the American public, reports of other types of terror attacks had already begun 
to enter the mainstream media. With increased regularity, the term “CBRN” (Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) was being used interchangeably with “WMD” 
(Weapons of Mass Destruction) to describe the events that would likely rival or surpass 
that experienced on 9/11.53 The article “Nuclear Nightmares,” written for the widely-
circulated New York Times, had undoubtedly raised concerns of a nuclear event occurring 
                                                 
51 Chertoff statement. 
52 A well-documented case of a terrorist group utilizing radiological material occurred on November 
23, 1995 in Izmailovsky Park, Russia. Chechen rebels placed a package containing cesium-137 without 
attaching it to an explosive device, or otherwise considered a radiation emission device (RED), under a 
park bench. Although this could technically be construed as a radiological event, it is worth mentioning that 
a distinction between an RDD and an RED does exist. It also demonstrates the attractiveness of using 
radiological material as a weapon and its relative ease of acquisition. 
53 Generally speaking, the acronyms “CBRN” and “CBRNE” (with the “E” representing high-yield 
explosives) are often times used interchangeably, depending upon the context and/or publication. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the former will be used to represent the more unconventional types of attacks. More 
specifically, CBRN is used throughout the NYC Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) document 
to distinguish these types of events as separate and distinct from conventional attacks using explosives. 
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on U.S. soil.54 But, the focus was now on the unconscionable act being committed by 
non-state actors rather than another nuclear-equipped nation. 
In a February, 2002 interview, then U.S. Office of Homeland Security Director 
Tom Ridge expressed concern that of all the potential terrorist attacks involving WMD, 
an incident involving nuclear materials was the one he feared most.55 To the uninformed 
NYC citizen, however, this generalization would likely invoke thoughts of a Hiroshima-
type mushroom cloud rising above the cavernous high-rise office buildings of 
Manhattan.56 For the sake of clarification, there is general agreement among experts that 
terrorists could conceivably exploit nuclear resources in four separate and distinct ways. 
Each one possesses varying degrees of severity and probability of occurrence. Table 1 
provides an overview of each of these four mechanisms. 
Within the realm of nuclear terrorism, the RDD attack is seen as the type most 
likely to occur. For example, former Clinton administration and current Carnegie 
Endowment expert on Russian nuclear safety, Rose Gottemoeller believes that “If there is 
a W.M.D. attack in the next year, it's likely to be a radiological attack.”57 The logic 
behind this school of thought is three-fold. First, radiological material is readily available 
to terrorists from commercial sources, and relatively easy to obtain through illicit 
transactions. Second, the weapon could be transported by terrorists to the intended target 
unimpeded if properly shielded from any existing radiation detection system. Third, a 
dirty bomb is fairly simple for terrorists to manufacture, with the greatest technical 
obstacle being the effectiveness of the radioactive dispersion.58 
Perhaps the most compelling case made for the probability of an RDD attack is 
put forth in a 2005 survey conducted by U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The survey polled a group of leading national 
                                                 
54 Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares.” 
55 Ibid. 
56 See, for example, the World Health Organization Web site, Radiological Dispersion Device 
information sheet, 
http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/en/WHORAD_InfoSheet_Dirty_Bombs21Feb.pdf  
57 Rose Gottemoeller, quoted in Keller, “Nuclear Nightmares.” 
58 Ferguson, Four Faces, 269-79. 
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security experts on various WMD proliferation issues. In comparison to the threat of a 
chemical, biological, or nuclear attack on a major city, the survey group found 
…the risk of a radiological attack as significantly higher. The median and 
average estimates of risk were 25% and 27.1% respectively over the next 
five years. Over ten years, both the median and the average estimate of 
risk jumped to 40%. The median estimate of the probability of a 
radiological attack over ten years was twice as high as the estimate for a 
nuclear or biological attack during the same period.59 
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a. Ferguson points out, “[under] most circumstances, it would be difficult for a 
terrorist organization to produce a massive radiation release from a U.S. nuclear facility. 
More terrorists, however, might be prepared to attempt this act than acquire and detonate 
a nuclear weapon.” 
b. It is worth noting that Henry Kelly of the Federation of American Scientists has 
estimated that the economic losses would be in the trillions of dollars. 
 
Most of the empirical data on the potential consequences of any future RDD 
attack is found in an analysis of a 1987 accidental radiological release of 1,375 curies of 
powdered cesium-137 in Goiania, Brazil. A case study of this unintended disaster found 
that it had resulted in the following: 
• Four deaths and 28 people with radiation burns; 
• At least 100 people with significant internal doses due to inhalation and 
ingestion; 
• Psychological and social effects caused by wide-spread panic; 
• Over 110,000 people seeking medical attention for perceived 
contamination (‘worried-well”); 
• Contamination of an area equivalent to approximately 40 city blocks, 
requiring $20 million in clean-up costs and the destruction of several 
homes and buildings; 
• Total damage to the local economy and its two main industries, tourism 
and agriculture.60 
Terrorist attacks involving CBRN are unique in the sense that each one presents 
its own inherent degree of destructive consequences and probability of occurrence. An 
RDD attack is just one of several utilizing nuclear material, however, it is considered the 
most likely to occur. The underlying potential for this type of attack on NYC is evident in 
the abundance of opportunities it presents for terrorists to maximize their rate of return. 
4. New York City’s Vulnerabilities 
Contrary to general public perception, an event involving an RDD will not likely 
result in an immediate health hazard to nearby people or first responders outside of the 
immediate point of detonation. 61 Unlike the mass casualties that would be rendered by a 
nuclear weapon or an IND, all prompt fatalities caused an RDD attack would be directly 
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61 Health Physics Society: Position Statement, “Guidance for Protective Actions Following a 
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or indirectly related to the explosion itself.  This absence of mass casualties leads many 
experts to categorize the RDD as more of a weapon of mass “disruption” rather than a 
weapon of mass destruction. Does this terminology hold true for an RDD attack in NYC? 
In order to put the RDD threat to NYC into proper context, consider the challenging 
consequences proposed by the following realistic scenario: 
At 8:30 a.m. on a Tuesday morning, as commuters converge on 
Manhattan, an al Qaeda operative explodes a dirty bomb outside the New 
York Stock Exchange. The device, while not especially powerful, contains 
a radioactive payload -- in this case, cesium extracted from radiological 
equipment that was stolen from a New Jersey hospital by a sleeper 
working there as a lab tech. 
The initial blast kills only a few dozen people, but radiation is quickly 
dispersed by the prevailing winds. Minutes after the explosion, New York 
City Police officers arrive -- still unaware of the real nature of the blast. 
But when a radiation detector in one officer's car goes wild, it becomes 
clear that a dirty bomb has detonated in the financial center of America's 
biggest city. 
Word of the explosion reverberates throughout New York. Many residents 
panic -- despite assurances from the mayor and police chief that 
contamination levels would exceed government limits only in about 40 
city blocks. And by 3 p.m., half of Manhattan has tried to leave, clogging 
trains, highways, and bridges. 
Six months later, the financial district remains largely off-limits, and the 
local economy is limping along amid a cratering of business confidence, 
the collapse of the tourism industry, and a property market in free fall. 
Economists put the eventual economic losses at an astronomical $1 
trillion.62 
Data has shown that the estimated loss to the NYC economy as a result of the 
9/11 attacks was approximately $27.3 billion for the rest of 2001 and all of 2002.63 
Contributing to this deficit was the approximate 30 percent reduction in Lower 
Manhattan office space and the destruction or temporary relocation of almost 200,000 
jobs. The overall damage of physical assets was estimated at just over $16 billion while 
                                                 
62 Spencer E. Ante, Amy Barrett, and Paul Magnusson, “New York Takes Another Hit,” 
BusinessWeek Online, September 19, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_38/b3951012.htm  (accessed January 19, 2006). 
63 Gail Makinen, “The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment,” Congressional 
Research Service (2002): 5-6.  
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rescue, cleanup, and related costs amounted to roughly $11 billion.64 More significant is 
the fact that all of the damage incurred that day took place in only a relatively small 
pocket within the entire NYC Financial District. 
An RDD attack in which 40 city blocks in Lower Manhattan are contaminated 
beyond Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines would undoubtedly cripple 
the local and regional economies.65 For example, despite a recent moderation, Manhattan 
real estate prices remain among the highest in the Nation.66 The devastating effects on the 
real estate market in general would be far-reaching since many homeowners in the 
affluent suburban communities surrounding NYC are employed by the financial firms in 
Manhattan. Wide-spread contamination would force major financial institutions to 
relocate away from NYC, many of which would ultimately choose not to return. As a 
result, employees of these firms would have no choice but to leave the metropolitan area. 
Inevitably, the lofty residential and commercial real estate prices would soon follow.67 
Of equal importance are the psychological effects an RDD attack would create on 
the general public. In fact, the World Health Organization states that 
The main purpose of a dirty bomb is to frighten people by contaminating 
their environment with radioactive materials and threatening large 
numbers of people with exposure. Such use of radiation is only 
hypothetical and has not been used by terrorists before, but the possibility 
exists. Dirty bombs are designed to spread fear and panic.68 
                                                 
64 Robert Looney, Strategic Insight: Economic Costs to the United States Stemming From the 9/11 
Attacks, Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School Center for Contemporary Conflict (2002). 
65 In his testimony, Henry Kelly states “Since there are often no effective ways to decontaminate 
buildings that have been exposed at these levels, demolition may be the only practical solution. If such an 
event were to take place in a city like New York, it would result in losses of potentially trillions of dollars.” 
66 David Leonhardt and Motoko Rich, “Slowing Is Seen in Housing Prices in Hot Markets,” New York 
Times, October 4, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/04/realestate/04reals.html?pagewanted=2&th&emc=th (accessed 
October 4, 2005). As of 9/30/05, the average sales price of co-op or condominium apartment in Manhattan 
was $1.15 million. 
67 Although there is recent evidence showing that speculators are already looking for value in the 
depressed areas of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, it is unclear whether there would be the same 
interest expressed in a radiation-contaminated NYC following an RDD attack. For example, in a case 
study, Ferguson found “Goiania [Brazil] had relied on tourism and agriculture to earn much of its revenue. 
Following this radiation safety accident, tourism plummeted, and people fled the region. Prices on 
agricultural goods fell even though they were found not to be contaminated. In effect, Goiania became a 
pariah city.” Ferguson, Four Faces, 270. 
68 World Health Organization Web site. 
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The fear generated following an RDD attack would stem largely from the 
properties of radiation itself; it is invisible, and undetectable to the human senses at low 
levels.69 Despite government officials’ assurances that the probability of long term health 
effects for most of the exposed would be minimal, the number of people demanding 
medical attention, or the “worried-well,” would likely be many multiples higher in NYC 
than the reported 110,000 in the Goiania incident. Conflicting media reports from subject 
matter experts attempting to provide guidance on the acceptable amounts of radiation 
exposure would only exacerbate the problem.70 
Whereas it is safe to assume that an RDD attack would, in certain respects, be 
disruptive to other geographic areas or local municipalities, the term “mass disruption” is 
misleading. The aftermath of an RDD attack in NYC would make the well-known visuals 
of 9/11 seem disruptive in comparison. If such an event were to take place in the areas of 
Lower or Midtown Manhattan, utter devastation would be offered on the entire NYC 
metropolitan area. Hence, it is entirely appropriate to consider a radiological attack at any 
one of these locations a weapon of mass “destruction” event. 
5. Implications for the U.S. 
If a successful RDD attack were to take place within the densely-populated areas 
of Manhattan the overall repercussions for the Nation in general could be substantial and 
very likely unprecedented. A recent report from a prominent think-tank suggests 
[The] economic ramifications of a successful radiological attack occurring 
in the continental United States could be enormous, irrespective of the 
number of people actually killed. Depending on the sophistication and size 
of the device, areas as large as tens of square miles could be contaminated 
at levels above recommended civilian exposure limits. In serious cases, 
demolition may be the only practical solution for dealing with affected 
buildings. Should such an event take place in a city such as New York, it 
would result in huge losses.71 
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In order to put the RDD incident depicted in the Goiania case study into a U.S. 
context, it is useful to compare its potential destructive nature to the fiscal impacts 
following 9/11 (Table 2). Whereas the attacks on NYC had a crippling short term effect 
on the local economy, the data presented in Table 2 shows that the medium term 
implications for the greater U.S. economy are even more significant. Furthermore, it 
should be presumed that the longer term, indirect effects of continued NYC terrorist 
activities on the global economy will likely give rise to increases in transaction costs and 
resulting decreases in output. For example, two separate studies have placed the total loss 
to the U.S. as a result of the 9/11 attacks at $639 billion and 40% of gross domestic 
product, respectively.72 Based upon the above assumptions, it is entirely feasible to 
transpose an RDD attack on NYC into Table 2 by replacing references to “transportation” 
and “airline” with “banking” and “financial.” 
 
Table 2. Economic Effects on the U.S. Following the 9/11 Attacks 
 
Medium Term Impacts of 9/11 Attacks Long Term Impacts of Future Terror 
Attacks 
Increases in insurance premiums for key 
industries (including aviation, 
transportation, construction, and tourism 
and energy generation) 
Increased spending on security, higher 
insurance premiums and longer wait times 
for activities 
Devaluation of airline industry Larger business inventories due to less 
reliable air and rail transportation 
Adverse effect on tourism and tourism-
related industries (including hotels, 
tourism, automobile rentals, travel agents, 
and civilian aircraft manufactures) 
Higher risk premiums transferred to 
businesses in the form of higher interest 
rates and lower equity prices, with an 
adverse effect on business investment, and 
a smaller capital stock 
Increase in underlying transportation costs Shift of resources away from the civilian 
labor force toward the military for use in 
the containment of terrorism 
Increases in security and military spending Shift away from globalization due to 
potential disruption of cross-border flows 
of goods and assets 
 
(From: Looney, Economic Costs from 9/11.) 
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It is worth pointing out that the overarching economic effect of terrorism is a 
matter of debate. For example, citing a quick post-9/11 economic recovery, at least one 
analyst downplays the economic effects of future terrorist acts given the enormity of the 
U.S. economy.73 Yet, while difficult to quantify the exact amount of economic damage 
likely to be incurred, the aforementioned BusinessWeek article suggests that losses 
resulting from an RDD attack in the area of the New York Stock Exchange could actually 
reach $1 trillion. Under the assumption that these projected losses would be the direct 
costs to the local economy, it would represent a significant increase over the $83 billion 
cumulative loss sustained by NYC as a result of 9/11.74 Since the actual outcome of 9/11 
and the predicted outcome of an RDD attack are similar in terms of relatively modest 
human casualties combined with tremendous economic consequences, it could be 
estimated that the contraction of the U.S. economy following an RDD event would 
exceed the cumulative economic fallout following 9/11 by an order-of-magnitude greater 
than 12.75 
6. Conclusion 
The radiological expert’s repeated use of NYC as the backdrop for an RDD attack 
is hardly arbitrary. With its dense population and highly concentrated area of key U.S. 
financial centers, NYC is widely considered the “Financial Capital of the World.” The 
daunting effect of a predicted $1 trillion loss suggests that NYC is a logical choice for al-
Qaeda and other terrorists groups motivated to attack the “nodes of the American 
economy.” Moreover, the media-entrenched island of Manhattan provides terrorists with 
the ultimate world-wide stage for a vivid portrayal of hundreds of thousands of people in 
mass panic. 
Undoubtedly, the economic impact of a successful RDD attack on the entire NYC 
region would likely make the after-effects of 9/11 seem mild by comparison. Regardless 
of the proclamations made by some economists touting its resiliency and apparent 
imperviousness, a severe contraction in the U.S. economy would be a tremendous blow 
                                                 
73 Makinen, “Economic Effects of 9/11,” 12. 
74 “According to one study conducted by one of New York’s leading management consulting firms, 
the attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center cost the city roughly $83 billion in direct 
economic losses.” Chalk, Trends in Terrorism, 21. 
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under normal circumstances. Given the recent burgeoning of the budget deficit, it must be 
anticipated that such a catastrophic event would have a profound and adverse effect on 
the U.S. economy. 
In basic terms, RDD risk is a function of the consequences of an attack multiplied 
by its probability of occurrence. As demonstrated in table 1 and reinforced throughout 
this chapter, in NYC, the value attached to these two factors is precariously high. 
Fortunately, policies and strategies can be revised, developed, and implemented to 
minimize both. The overall cost of financing this enhanced preparedness with additional 
expenditures on equipment, training, and planning is minimal, especially when compared 
with the potential benefits to be gained. Fortunately, DHS acknowledges that the threat is 
real and has earmarked additional preparedness funding for such catastrophic events. The 
remaining chapters of this thesis will focus on how first responders can best utilize this 
funding to increase RDD preparedness and lower the overall RDD risk; thereby providing 
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IV. PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 
A. FIRST RESPONDER APPLICATION OF RADIATION DETECTION 
TECHNOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
A sure-fire solution to the problems presented by a potential terrorist attack 
employing a “dirty bomb” would be to secure all supplies of radiological material. 
However, short of the impossible task of successfully accounting for and controlling all 
of these sources, the most effective measure that may be taken to prevent, and possibly 
deter, an RDD attack is the installation of gamma radiation detection systems. 
Meanwhile, although the future prospects for these systems are promising, early detection 
is often difficult and ineffective.76 Fortunately, in the likelihood that pre-emptive 
measures fail, radiation detection technology can also be utilized for the resulting 
incident management and response functions. 
In a 2003 meeting with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), 
U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham called for an improvement in U.S. 
technology to counter the threat of an RDD attack.77 More specifically, personal radiation 
detectors, hand-held survey meters, radionuclide identifier devices, and radiation portal 
monitors represent the tools currently available to achieve these objectives.78 Hence, the 
use of this technology to assist NYC first responder agencies prepare for this type of 
event is an essential aspect of an RDD prevention and response strategy. This chapter 
will examine the utility of each of these technologies and point out their deficiencies and 
shortcomings. It will also suggest practical recommendations for those senior level 
managers tasked with making RDD prevention and response policy decisions. 
2. Personal Radiation Detectors 
Perhaps the most simplistic of the radiation detection devices in terms of utility, 
the personal radiation detector (PRD) is a small and relatively sensitive device that is 
generally used by first responders as an early warning system.79  It operates by detecting 
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photons and/or neutrons and transferring them into light, and using a scintillator attached 
to an electronic photo-multiplier to count impulses. The PRD indicates higher levels of 
radioactivity by way of a “clicking” noise, a preset audible alert, and/or a numeric digital 
readout. Although the FDNY and the NYPD both utilize these types of devices as 
primarily a “proof-positive” tool for radiation detection, particularly in the aftermath of 
an RDD attack, the main objectives of its application by each agency are somewhat 
different.80 
Utility for Prevention and Response: In 2003, the FDNY issued Radalert 50 
radiological monitors and corresponding written guidelines to all first responder units 
operating in the field.81 Included in the types of events recommended for its use are 
incidents involving explosives or explosive material, or in other words, a potential RDD. 
The device is set to audibly alarm at a level 1.00 mR/hr (milliroentgens per hour) which, 
considering normal background levels are between .01 and .05 mR/hr, constitutes an 
elevated, but still very safe level of radiation. Current operational procedures call for 
deploying the device(s) in such a manner as to establish an isolation zone, or hot zone, 
around the incident scene using a 2.00 mR/hr threshold on its LCD display. At this point, 
with the exception of performing risk/reward-based life saving operations, all first 
responding FDNY personnel are advised to operate defensively until the arrival of more 
highly trained and equipped units. As an added layer of protection, each field unit is 
supplied with a pager-type detector with higher dose rate (mR-R range) capabilities, and 
a set of personal dosimeters to measure total accumulated dose. Thus, first arriving units 
are directed to collectively utilize all of these devices to further monitor conditions and 
exposure while performing any immediate life-saving operations. 
Another directive put forth in the FDNY Radalert 50 operating procedures is the 
use of the monitor for the purpose of radioactive plume tracking. Immediately following 
an RDD explosion, all FDNY units citywide equipped with these devices may be notified 
to take and record readings at intervals specified by the Bureau of Operations. The 
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readings will then be faxed to the Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC) staff 
where the results will be plotted on a citywide unit location map. 
Periodically, the FDNY issues an official order reminding field units to maintain 
the Radalert 50 in the “on” position at all times. This is intended as a possible preventive 
measure since units generally move about the City within their designated response areas 
on a twenty-four hour basis. In essence, the overall concept is one of a network of mobile 
sensors capable of detecting the radioactive material used in a potential dirty bomb. 
The NYPD has also recently developed its own PRD capability and, to protect 
against the threat of a radiological attack, has issued pager-type radiological detectors to 
all police sergeants on patrol.82 The concept of operations for these devices is similar to 
that proposed by the FDNY’s network of mobile sensors; however, the primary objective 
for its use, unlike the FDNY, is interdiction before an attack occurs.83 For example, a 
PRD-equipped officer standing next to a truck at a traffic stop could potentially detect if 
it were carrying the radioactive material that could be used for an RDD. But, despite this 
well-intentioned operational strategy, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has 
determined that these devices, when used alone, have certain limitations for search and 
are most effective only when used in conjunction with portal monitors.84 
Shortcomings and Deficiencies: Some of the FDNY’s guidelines for use of the 
Radalert 50, while ambitious and well-intentioned, must be reviewed when applied to the 
response to an RDD explosion. Recent studies have recommended that an initial hot zone 
be set up within 500 meters of the release if the source material is unknown, or at 1 R/hr 
(roentgen per hour).85 Using dose rate as the parameter for the establishment of an access 
control line, this newly proposed guideline is 500 times less restrictive than the current 
FDNY Radalert 50 protocol. Also, this device is only able to provide readings of up to 50 
mR/hr before reaching the maximum gauging capacity. Depending on the exact nature of 
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the release, first responding units may be required to set up an initial hot zone at a 
location too far away from the incident site to effectively perform life saving operations 
for those injured or trapped as a result of the explosion. Likewise, the use of the pager-
type PRDs may be somewhat limited because only one such meter is assigned per unit; 
thus, rescuers are restricted to operating close together in teams of five or six. 
Aside from the fact that the DOE has found that pager-type PRDs have certain 
limitations for prevention, a critical issue surrounding the NYPD’s use of this equipment 
is the lack of a coordinated emergency response plan with the FDNY. An RDD attack in 
NYC, in the areas of Midtown and Lower Manhattan in particular, will necessitate a well-
organized response utilizing all the technology, equipment, and capability that is 
currently available. Unfortunately, until a logical, task-specific, inter-agency plan is 
formulated and practiced, any advantages gained from advancement in PRD technology 
will not be fully realized; and will certainly result in less than optimum RDD 
consequence management. It is also worth noting that NYPD sergeants are not equipped 
with sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE), particularly self-contained breathing 
apparatus, to allow safe emergency and/or life saving operations during the initial stages 
of an RDD explosion. Hence, the use of these devices by this group of NYPD officers 
should be deemed to be primarily preventive in nature; in spite of the fact its tactical 
efficiency in this regard is also generally limited. 
Recommendations: The FDNY should continue to monitor ongoing testing of the 
Canberra Ultra-Radiac PRD in order to expedite its issuance to all firefighters and fire 
officers Citywide.86 This device is small, rugged, and in addition to total dose, it can 
measure dose rate up to 500 R/hr. The higher dose rate capability will enable first 
responding units to more accurately delineate work zones in high dose fields. 
Additionally, when used in conjunction with the Radalert 50, it will enhance the 
prevention capabilities of these units, especially when they are carried into buildings 
during the normal course of emergency operations and inspectional duties. 
During the emergency response phase of an RDD attack, NYPD officers equipped 
with PRDs, operating within the limitations of basic PPE such as goggles, gloves, and a 
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half-face air purifying respirator, should be assigned to establish, maintain, and control 
the larger, uncontaminated area of the cold zone.87 
The most crucial requirement for the effective use of PRD technology is inter-
agency cooperation. This can best be accomplished by recognizing the level of training, 
protective equipment, and capability of both first responder agencies; formulating a joint 
inter-agency response plan based upon the operating parameters of the PRD; and then 
practicing the plan with periodic joint training sessions. Institutionalizing these measures 
will ensure that all first responders are adequately prepared to operate cohesively in a 
radioactive environment and offset many of the significant challenges presented by an 
RDD attack. 
3. Hand-Held Survey Meters 
Another necessary first responder radiation detection tool is the hand-held survey 
meter. This device operates on the same principle as the PRD, but with more refined 
electronics and wider dynamic range.88 Some types also have the advantage of applying 
interchangeable probes to achieve different objectives. Because the FDNY will be in 
command of life safety operations and decontamination at an RDD event, this agency 
will likely obtain the most benefit from this device. 
Utility for Prevention and Response: Whereas FDNY units equipped with PRDs 
(Radalert 50 and future acquisition of the Canberra Ultra-Radiac) can serve as a 
preventative mobile force of detection, survey meters are generally not used in this 
regard. Instead, it is used primarily for consequence management. For example, the 
FDNY utilizes the Ludlum 2241 survey meter with three different types of probes: the 
pancake probe for determining if a person or object is contaminated by measuring counts 
per minute; a beta/gamma scintillator probe for taking dose rate readings in the fairly 
wide range of mR/hr to R/hr; and a alpha scintillator probe for measuring the dose rate of 
alpha particles. 
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There are approximately seventy-five survey meters in service for use by FDNY 
units Citywide.89 Following an RDD explosion, units on the scene equipped with these 
meters will initially take readings using the beta/gamma and alpha scintillator probes. 
The main tactical objectives of these units are to redefine the previously established 
initial hot line, and to locate any “hotspots,” or highly radioactive areas. Once the 
decontamination phase of the operation commences, these units will then utilize the 
pancake probe for scanning contaminated persons. 
Shortcomings and Deficiencies: Due to the geographically dispersed location of 
units equipped with these meters, and the difficulties they will confront trying to get into 
an incident scene with a panic-stricken general public, it will take too much time to get an 
adequate number of hand-held survey meters on the scene to effectively identify 
“hotspots” and access control points (evacuation corridors) in a timely manner. 
Meanwhile, when enough meters finally become readily available, there will be too many 
persons from various agencies (FDNY, NYPD, DOHMH) reporting meter readings from 
too many locations to enable an Incident Commander to make a informed, sound, and 
timely evacuation or shelter-in-place decision. 
After contaminated victims are isolated and asked to remove their outer clothing 
(dry decontamination), the next tactical step for first responders involves measurement of 
radiation exposure prior to more extensive, technical decontamination. However, it is a 
time consuming process to monitor persons using the pancake probe. A generally 
accepted principle among first responders is that it takes approximately five to ten 
minutes to sufficiently scan a contaminated victim.90 Given the tens of thousands of 
people that may need to be monitored, and the limited amount of devices and trained 
personnel, this shortcoming presents a significant operational challenge. At an RDD 
attack in Midtown or Lower Manhattan this mission could conceivably take days to 
accomplish. 
Recommendations: A recently instituted program sponsored by the DHS and 
EML called the Radiological Emergency Management System (REMS) utilizes a system 
                                                 
89 Schlueck interview. 
90 This information was provided by the members of FDNY Engine Company 44, a highly-trained 
hazardous materials technician unit, personal conversation with author, June 28, 2005. 
37 
of networked radiation sensors designed for the purpose of providing first responders 
with a “single picture of [the] threat during [the] time of weakest coordination.”91 The 
newly devised plan places fixed sensor units at strategic locations in Manhattan, south of 
59th St., and near high profile sites (i.e. financial, transportation centers). These detectors, 
dubbed the Comprehensive Radiation Sensor – Generation II, are installed outdoors, 2-12 
stories above street level, with a clear view of the southern sky (for satellite purposes).92 
The readings produced by the sensors are sent to and monitored by EML and the NYC 
OEM 24 hours a day, and seven days a week. Proclaiming the efficacy of this proto-type 
system, EML touts that “[timely, authoritative, accurate, information increases public 
cooperation; avoids panic; minimizes disruption; and facilitates recovery.]”93 Hence, this 
program should be further developed, supported, and funded, as it will assist first 
responders in accomplishing these critical RDD consequence management goals. 
However, in order to fully realize the capabilities of this incident management 
technology, the concept of operations should provide for the processed data to be 
monitored directly at the scene by the Incident Commander from the first responder 
agency responsible for life safety operations. With further refinement and integration into 
an inter-agency response plan, this innovative technology could effectually negate the 
aforementioned operational shortcomings of the hand-held survey meters. 
In order to accommodate the prolonged and extensive decontamination and 
monitoring operations that will be required following an RDD attack, sheltering-in-place 
strategies should be developed for the densely-populated areas of Midtown and Lower 
Manhattan. Moreover, site-specific shelters (i.e. armories, schools) should be pre-
designated as casualty collection points in the likely event that large numbers of people 
will self-evacuate prior to, or in spite of, official instruction. 
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4. Radionuclide Identifier Devices 
Application of PRDs and hand-held survey meters by first responders for 
interdiction of illegal radioactive sources, or incident management in the aftermath of an 
explosive RDD attack, is limited to determining the general presence and/or level of 
gamma radiation. However, in order to obtain a more complete picture of the overall 
threat, it is always necessary to identify the specific type of isotope in question. The 
radionuclide identifier device (RID), by utilizing a sodium iodide detector, a 
photomultiplier, and other related electronics, creates a pulse-height spectrum to expose 
the exact type of gamma source present.94 
Utility for Prevention and Response: Although information on the specific use 
and capability for the RID by the NYPD is not readily available, the utility of the device 
for RDD prevention by law enforcement agencies so equipped is to separate legal 
radioactive sources from those intended to inflict harm. For example, there exists, 
throughout normal course of everyday life, many radioactive materials that are neither 
dangerous nor illegal. Monitoring officials must be able to decipher commonly 
transported radioactive cargo, including ceramic tiles, bananas, and kitty litter, from the 
Cs137 used in a “dirty bomb.” The RID can be deployed to adequately perform this 
function and avoid the labor intensive task of manually checking every “hit” on a PRD, 
survey meter, and/or portal monitor. This will allow legal commerce to proceed 
unimpeded. 
During the early stages of an RDD event with a radioactive release, FDNY 
Hazardous Materials (Haz-Mat) Co. #1 will respond into the scene as the only Fire 
Department unit Citywide equipped with a hand-held RID. Once this highly-specialized 
FDNY unit properly identifies the type of isotope and spectra, the results will be 
transmitted to the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) for 
specific guidance.95 Since all radiological materials possess physical and chemical 
properties in addition to its radioactivity, Haz-Mat Co. #1 will then find it necessary to 
make a determination as to the type of decontamination to be undertaken, wet or dry. 
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Thus, for events involving certain isotopes, they may decide it more beneficial not to use 
the water curtain corridor provided by the FDNY mass decontamination procedure. 
Shortcomings and Deficiencies: Whereas the limitations of the PRDs and survey 
meters are generally strategic and operational in nature, the RID presents significant 
mechanical deficiencies. “The need to miniaturize a lab system, use batteries, and keep 
size, weight, and cost low inevitably compromises [RID] performance.”96 Durability, 
sensitivity, and responsiveness are cited as reliability issues that need to be addressed for 
all types of devices, inclusive of the RID.97 Laboratory tests have also shown that 
identifier devices produce an inordinate amount of false positive and false negative 
readings.98 
Recommendation: Senior FDNY and NYPD decision makers in charge of 
technology and equipment procurement must hold the manufacturers of the RID to 
account by making informed purchases and demanding certain minimum requirements. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and DHS have recently 
conducted performance tests and evaluations of commercially available radiation 
detectors for the guidance of first responder agencies.99 It is incumbent on management 
to carefully assess the results of these tests prior to making an investment in this 
relatively expensive piece of equipment. 
5. Radiation Portal Monitors 
The radiation portal monitor (RPM) is a large and extremely sensitive radiological 
detection apparatus that is most notably found at fixed locations near shipping and border 
ports of entry. Most of these detectors incorporate a plastic scintillator attached to a 
phototube and mounted in a water-resistant housing placed on both sides of vehicular 
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lane of traffic.100 Due to the relatively high degree of sensitivity, RPMs are usually used 
in conjunction with various types of hand-held devices for greater isotope discrimination. 
Utility for Prevention and Response: In addition to its well-known function at 
ports, the RPM is also employed at strategic locations in and around the perimeter of a 
city. In NYC, for instance, there are fixed monitors in place near certain metropolitan 
area bridges and tolls. Also, as a proactive preventive measure, the NYPD has reportedly 
set up portable RPMs at undisclosed times and locations.101 The utilization of this 
technology is seemingly all part of the “multi-layered defense” concept of operations put 
forth by the DHS-sponsored NY/NJ Radiological Pilot Program. Although portable 
RPMs could conceivably be used to scan contaminated victims as a function of 
consequence management, at this time, this procedure does not appear to be part of any 
formalized NYC protocol. Hence, the RPM should generally be considered an RDD 
prevention device. 
Shortcomings and Deficiencies Perhaps the most noteworthy deficiency of the 
RPM is that it is unable to discern between naturally occurring radioactive products and 
those materials likely to be used in an RDD.102 In fact, these detectors function so 
aimlessly that some U.S. Customs officials have described them as “dumb sensors.”103  
As previously mentioned, these devices must be used along with other hand-held 
detecting equipment, such as the RID, in order to properly rule out illicit sources. 
From an operational standpoint, the RPM presents significant problems in regards 
to economic efficiency. Each passing vehicle, person, or package that creates a positive 
“hit” on the meter must be further examined by a Customs official or police officer. In 
order to fully realize the benefit of this technology as it now stands, this task could 
potentially require agencies to hire additional personnel for surveillance duties. 
Additionally, frequent and repeated traffic stops required by the inspections could result 
in increased shipping costs and/or decreases in worker productivity. Thus, private 
industry may also pay the price for the inferior product design of the RPM. 
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Recommendation: Until the effectiveness of the technology catches up to the 
basic needs and requirements of first responder agencies, these devices will provide a 
false sense of security. Again, senior-level decision makers should continue to work with 
the manufacturers of the devices; the national laboratories tasked with designing new and 
improved technology; and the organizations charged with testing its performance. With 
more advanced RPM technology, the current shortfalls found in this aspect of RDD 
prevention and response could be sufficiently reduced. 
6. Conclusion 
In the post-9/11 era, the advancement of radiation detection technology is 
necessarily undergoing a transformation in order to meet the needs of homeland security. 
Various national laboratories are analyzing the RDD threat and assessing the demands 
placed upon the first responder community for preventing and responding to an attack. 
However, these technical experts cannot proceed alone with this endeavor. Senior level 
decision makers from NYC first responder agencies must continue to work together with 
product engineers and manufacturers to specify the usefulness of any new technology; 
while at the same time participate in ongoing testing in order to identify deficiencies with 
the equipment currently proposed or already in use. Of equal importance, however, is the 
need to understand the complexity of the potential event in relation to the limitations of 
the devices themselves and the capabilities of the responding agencies as a whole.  Only 
through the continuous evaluation, development, and improvement of new and existing 
technology, and the operational strategies proposed in the remaining chapters, can the 
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V. PUBLIC AWARENESS 
A. MANAGING RADIOLOGICAL FEAR THROUGH PUBLIC EDUCATION 
AND RISK COMMUNICATION 
1. Introduction 
Among the many preparedness challenges NYC faces for a terrorist attack 
involving a “dirty bomb”, perhaps the most significant is to effectively reduce the 
pervasive fear that would likely infect the general public in its aftermath. A 2004 article 
for the Defense News suggests that “Psychologically immunizing citizens, through a 
credible public education campaign, about the usually limited consequences of a dirty 
bomb, and its differences from a nuclear weapon, lessens terrorists' ability to cause undue 
panic -- an easy way to make an attack less inviting.”104 Seemingly, the best way to meet 
this objective is to provide NYC’s citizens with accurate information on the likely 
radiological effects presented by such an event, and a clear and unambiguous set of 
emergency response instructions to deal with its consequences.105 
The National Academy of Sciences suggests “To optimize the overall health and 
well being of the population, and to improve the overall response to terrorism events, it is 
necessary that [psychological reactions] be addressed preventively as well as throughout 
the phases of an event.”106 NYC’s first responder agencies, the FDNY and NYPD, are 
sworn to uphold these objectives for all types of terror attacks, including those involving 
an RDD. Hence, they must develop innovative programs for managing any adverse 
psychological effects that would likely result from this potentially catastrophic event. 
More specifically, it is recommended that a functional strategy, referred to as the Haddon 
Matrix, be used to formulate a comprehensive psychological consequence preparedness 
plan.107 Although this matrix can be used for all phases and factors of a terrorist attack, 
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first responders would be primarily involved in initiatives associated with the pre-event 
and event stages. The applicability of these two stages, as it relates to radiological fear 
management, will be the focus of this chapter. 
2. Fear of Radiation 
The average citizen’s fear of radiation is a phenomenon that has been 
demonstrated in a select few number of case studies; most notably, the accidental releases 
of radiation at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Goiania, Brazil, each of which resulted 
in “extreme public anxiety.”108 The inability to detect radiation with the human senses, a 
general lack of knowledge of its effects, and the fact that the after-effects of exposure 
may not develop until years later, are cited as plausible explanations for the anxious and 
defenseless behavior exhibited at these incidents. However, contrary to general public 
perception, experts on the physiological effects of a radiological attack suggest that an 
event involving a RDD will not likely cause an immediate health hazard to nearby people 
or first responders outside of the immediate point of detonation.109 While this estimation 
may arguably hold true, others point to the psychological effects as potentially taking the 
greatest toll on public health.110 
It is important to note that the public’s fear of the unknown is neither new nor 
insurmountable. For example, history has shown that the initial fear associated with the 
hazards of the modern technologies of electricity and natural gas had eventually subsided 
over time.111 Theoretically, an increase in familiarity will lead to acceptance of the 
hazard and a subsequent decrease in the perceived risk. Not surprisingly, a 1994 National 
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) study concluded that “The 
bedrock foundation of any plan to protect the public from radiation effects, particularly in 
time of emergency, is reliable information presented to an informed public.”112 
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It is not difficult to imagine how NYC citizens sitting in their office spaces or 
dwellings might seek direction immediately following a reported “dirty bomb” explosion. 
An internet search engine request on “New York City dirty bomb preparedness” produces 
many readily available sources for information on official government and private sector 
Web sites. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Web site 
recommends heightened public awareness for terrorist attacks, including those involving 
a RDD, and has developed a set of specific guidelines for the uninformed citizen to 
follow. Likewise, the Web sites of the NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM), 
RAND Corporation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) each have their own links for similar type instructions. 
Unfortunately, however, when taken collectively, the preparedness and response 
guidance to an RDD event that is currently available to the general public is largely 
inconsistent.113 Meanwhile, it has also been suggested that “lack of consensus [on 
causative exposure] among experts can increase public fear and anger.”114 Table 3 
extracts from the aforementioned sites relevant information that NYC’s first responder 
personnel could reasonably expect the general public to utilize during the pre-event and 
event phases of an RDD incident. 
Although the data presented in Table 3 is not all-inclusive, it does consolidate the 
information provided by each Web site regarding: 
• the lethality of the event; 
• the exposure to radiation and/or risk of cancer; 
• the best practices for evacuation and sheltering; 
• the measures for respiratory protection and personal decontamination. 
 
Upon close comparison, the tactical information offered from one site to the next 
ranges from subtle differences to outright discrepancy. For example, for persons caught 
outside during the radiological release, the FEMA site recommends “…seek shelter 
indoors immediately in the nearest undamaged building;” the DHS site states “…go 
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inside a building that has not been damaged;” while the NRC site instructs “Move away 
from the immediate area--at least several blocks from the explosion--and go inside.” For 
pedestrians seeking protection from radioactive fallout following an RDD attack it is 
quite evident that, depending on the circumstances, this disparate guidance could result in 
serious health implications. 
Of particular concern is the information provided by the NYC OEM Web site. 
Perhaps the one site to which the NYC’s citizens would most likely refer, it is the 
undoubtedly the most generic of the lot. Given the probability that the structural and 
population density in NYC, and in the borough of Manhattan more specifically, would 
present first responders with significant obstacles at a large-scale event, a uniform and 
dependable public information strategy must be devised for the pre-event and event 
phases of an RDD incident. 
 
Table 3. Examples of Web sites Offering Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) 
Information 
 






• In most cases, the amount of material is 
unlikely to be lethal. 
• More damage and casualties may result 
from the explosion than from the radiation 
itself. 
 
• If you are outside, get inside. Remove all 
clothing and wash thoroughly. 
• If there’s an event indoors, try to get out of 
the building without passing through the 
contaminated area. If you cannot escape, it 
may be better to shelter in place. 







• Some devices could cause fatalities from 
exposure to radioactive materials.  
• Depending on the speed at which the area 
of the RDD detonation was evacuated or 
how successful people were at sheltering-
in-place, the number of deaths and injuries 
from an RDD might not be substantially 
greater than from a conventional bomb 
explosion. 
• If you are outdoors, seek shelter indoors 
immediately in the nearest undamaged 
building. 
• If the explosion or radiological release 
occurs inside, get out immediately and seek 
safe shelter.  
• Remove and bag clothing (and isolate the 
bag away from you and others), and shower 
thoroughly with soap and water. 
• As you seek shelter from any location 
(indoors or outdoors) and there is visual dust 
or other contaminants in the air, breathe 
through the cloth of your shirt or coat to 
limit your exposure.  
• If you have time, turn off ventilation and 
heating systems, close windows, vents, 






• It is not a nuclear blast. The force of the 
explosion and radioactive contamination 
will be more localized. 
• As with any radiation, you want to try to 
• If you are outside and there is an explosion 
or authorities warn of a radiation release 
nearby…go inside a building that has not 
been damaged. If you are already inside 
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limit exposure. It is important to avoid 
breathing radiological dust that may be 
released in the air. 
check to see if your building has been 
damaged. If your building is stable, stay 
where you are. 
• If you are inside and there is an explosion 
near where you are or you are warned of a 
radiation release inside, cover nose and 
mouth and go outside immediately. Look for 
a building or other shelter that has not been 
damaged and quickly get inside. 
• Once you are inside, close windows and 
doors; turn off air conditioners, heaters or 





• In most instances, the conventional 
explosive itself would have more 
immediate lethality than the radioactive 
material. 
• A dirty bomb is in no way similar to a 
nuclear weapon.  
• Just because a person is near a radioactive 
source for a short time or gets a small 
amount of radioactive dust on himself or 
herself does not mean he or she will get 
cancer. The additional risk will likely be 
very small. 
• Move away from the immediate area--at 
least several blocks from the explosion--and 
go inside. This will reduce exposure to any 
radioactive airborne dust. 
• Take a shower to wash off dust and dirt. This 
will reduce total radiation exposure, if the 





• Beyond the risk of immediate injury from 
the explosion itself, the primary initial 
danger is inhaling the radioactive material 
that is suspended within the dust and 
smoke from the explosion. 
• The levels of radiation will be quite low, so 
the main concern is an elevated risk of 
cancer, which will only manifest itself after 
many years. 
• For an outdoor explosion, if you are outside, 
take shelter inside the nearest undamaged 
building; if you are inside an undamaged and 
unthreatened building, stay there. If the 
explosion occurs inside your building, get 
out. 
• Decontaminate by removing clothing and 
showering. 
• Close windows and doors and shut down 
ventilation systems. 
• You can further protect yourself by covering 
your nose and mouth. A dust mask (one with 
an N95-rated particulate filter) would be 
most helpful, but any cloth available will do, 
such as a shirt. 
 
(From: See the New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Web site, 
http://nyc.gov/html/oem/pdf/readyny_english.pdf; the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) Web site, 
http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/radiological_dispersion_device.shtm; the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) Web site, http://www.ready.gov/america/radiation.html; the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html; the RAND Corporation Web site, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR1731.1.pdf). 
 
3. Pre-event Fear Management 
The concept of being attacked by terrorists using a “dirty bomb,” is not a choice 
matter of discourse for the general public, or for that matter, NYC public officials. One 
could candidly argue that to discuss such issues would create undue panic and 
apprehension, especially since an attack of its kind has not yet been attempted. On the 
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other hand, when asked about the unfortunate experience of a catastrophic fire occurring 
in one’s home, the dialogue would likely garner less angst. This line of reasoning 
suggests that society as a whole is exposed to the tragedies and consequences resulting 
from fires with relative regularity. However, a general survey of the population would 
likely reveal that the vast majority would have not personally experienced a fire in their 
lifetime. Regardless of these assumptions, a constant state of fire prevention awareness 
and preparedness is instilled at a very early age. For example, a child is taught in grade 
school the following basic fire safety tenets: “Stop, drop, and roll.” “Stay low and crawl 
below the smoke.” “Plan a way out.” This leads to the question: Is a terrorist attack using 
a RDD any less devastating than a fire? 
According to a Cato Institute policy analysis, emergency preparedness is 
contingent upon gaining public support through an education and information 
campaign.115 But, as demonstrated by the overly generalized information provided by the 
NYC OEM Web site, the extent of NYC’s adherence to this particular aspect of terrorism 
preparedness appears suspect. It is worth noting that preventing fires in NYC is a critical 
mission of the FDNY; and as such, it has in place a comprehensive, formalized fire 
prevention program. Likewise, a terrorism awareness and preparedness campaign based 
in principle upon this highly successful public safety program could be equally effective. 
A RAND study on citizen preparedness to terrorist attacks finds “The more that 
individuals know about government plans for emergency… the better prepared they will 
be to respond appropriately and the more likely they will be to comply with what officials 
suggest.”116 A cost effective solution for reversing NYC’s shortcomings in terrorism 
education is to incorporate reliable information into a citizen’s emergency response 
guide. A NYC-specific public information pamphlet could be produced and published 
through a joint FDNY and NYPD inter-agency program and distributed during a 
proposed NYC Public Safety/Terrorism Preparedness Campaign. Once each calendar 
year, commencing on the second Monday in September, both agencies could participate 
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in a week-long public/private sector initiative entitled NYC Public Safety/Terrorism 
Preparedness Week.117  The recommended details of the program are as follows: 
Public Sector Responsibilities 
• The campaign would focus on terrorism-related safety and preparedness 
activities, and would replace regularly scheduled activities (drills, building 
inspections etc.) for duration of the campaign.  
• The program would include, but not be limited to: 
1. Distribution of terrorism preparedness and awareness literature. 
2. Local area outdoor exercise/drill sessions utilizing the equipment, 
technology, and procedures likely to be used during a terrorist 
attack. 
• Specialized units from both agencies with enhanced terrorism-related 
capabilities would be scheduled to participate in demonstrations at various 
locations throughout the City. 
• Suggested locations for the campaign activities would include: 
1. Symbolic and historical buildings and landmarks 
2. Financial institutions 
3. Mass transportation stations 
4. Schools and universities 
5. Hotels 
6. Theatres and other places of public assembly 
7. Malls and shopping centers 
• Each agency’s public information officer (PIO) would coordinate with the 
local media to promote the campaign and provide the location of the 
various exercise/drill sites throughout the City. 
Private Sector Responsibilities 
• Building management would promote the campaign to all employees and 
encourage attendance and participation at the joint FDNY/NYPD drill 
sessions. 
• Private companies would ensure that sufficient time is allotted for 
employees to participate in terrorism preparedness activities. 
• Throughout the week-long campaign, building management would review 
building-specific shelter-in-place/evacuation plans with all employees. 
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50 
4. Event Fear Management 
It is critically important that first responders be armed with accurate and reliable 
information for the inquiring public prior to operating at a large-scale incident caused by 
an RDD attack. During an event, first responders are well-positioned to provide critical 
information that would quell the initial fear stemmed by the unknown of radiation 
exposure. In fact, one particular terrorism preparedness guide offered by the 
Homeownership Alliance in conjunction with DHS instructs occupants to “Be prepared 
to adapt this information to your personal circumstances and make every effort to follow 
instructions you receive from authorities on the scene.”118 Moreover, the NCRP has 
found that 
The public will accept advice and guidance from emergency personnel if it 
is confident that the personnel are credible and capable of comprehending 
and dealing with the emergency. Emergency workers should have a 
satisfactory understanding of radiation hazards and means to deal with 
them.119  
Thus, a first responder workforce trained to provide safe and accurate information 
regarding the potential levels of radiation exposure would gain the trust of those exposed, 
which would result in a more cooperative general public, and lead to a better organized 
emergency response effort. 
Information given to the public regarding the radiation emergency must not only 
be accurate but must also be delivered promptly.120 The importance of releasing such 
timely information following an RDD attack is evidenced by the legal requirement 
imposed upon government officials for notifying the public within 15 minutes after being 
alerted to an incident involving a commercial nuclear power plant. While a small 
percentage of the NYC population will have immediate access to prompt information 
delivered by public officials via the media outlets of television and radio, the vast 
majority will likely receive first notice of the event from first responders at the scene. 
Hence, in order to attain maximum compliance with official instruction offered in the 
                                                 
118 Homeownership Alliance Web site. 
http://www.homeownershipalliance.com./tips_and_resources/emergency.php (accessed November 16, 
2005). 
119 NCRP, “Advising the Public,” 9. 
120 Ibid., 5, and Ferguson, Four Faces, 308. 
51 
initial stages of the emergency response, it is essential that the FDNY and NYPD 
institutionalize an inter-agency Risk Communication Plan. 
The overarching objective of this proposed strategy is to expedite the release of 
scenario specific information in the immediate aftermath of an attack. Despite the many 
intrinsic barriers prohibiting effective risk communication to the public, there exists 
feasible solutions to the problems.121 A research scientist at Carnegie Mellon University 
recommends that the first step involves taking a proactive approach to each possible 
scenario. He states that 
We have the ability to design, research, and refine messages for the most 
likely threat potentials. Further, cognitive psychologists could test the 
messages during mock exercises…Thus, it is possible to develop 
proactively a series of “evidence-based messages,” rather than develop 
messages in a perpetually ad hoc fashion as situations arise.122  
To best implement this strategy, pre-planned messages could be formulated by a 
specially-trained, inter-agency Risk Communication Team consisting of designated 
FDNY, NYPD, and DOHMH officials. The primary objective of this unit would be to 
“focus on what the public should know, rather than how and what the public should be 
told.”123 So that this information would ultimately be delivered in the most consistent 
way possible, this team would develop a protocol for educating all first responders from 
both agencies. It would also be deployed during an actual crisis for the benefit of on-
scene Incident Commanders, and for the purpose of reinforcing pre-existing messages 
and releasing up-to-date information. 
5. Conclusion 
Only by providing the citizenry with timely and accurate information can the 
psychological stress caused by the age-old fear of radiation become more manageable. In 
NYC, the current guidance in place for accomplishing this task seemingly does not go far 
enough. NYC public safety officials should heed the advice offered by the 
aforementioned RAND report on preparedness, which finds that “Beyond simply 
                                                 
121 Victor W. Weedn, “Public Information and Risk Communication in Times of Crises,” in A Little 
Knowledge: Privacy, Security, and Public Information after September 11 (New York: Century Foundation 
Press, 2004), 57-69. 
122 Weedn, “Public Information,” 66. 
123 Ibid. 
52 
providing basic information, governments and private industry can spearhead formal 
education and training programs, to take knowledge from theory to practice.”124 An inter-
agency plan for the development of an official public awareness campaign and a Risk 
Communication Team, designed to disseminate information both prior to and during an 
actual RDD event, are low-cost solutions to the hindrances placed upon the current 
guidelines for raising the public’s level of awareness. It is incumbent upon NYC’s first 
responder agencies to implement these strategies in order to achieve an overall increase 
in RDD preparedness. They could prove to be particularly helpful when applied in 
conjunction with the sheltering-in-place strategies exhibited in the next chapter. 
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VI. SHELTERING-IN-PLACE 
A. MANHATTAN SHELTER-IN-PLACE FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
Since protecting the civilian population from radiation exposure is clearly a key 
tenet in RDD emergency response, it is necessary to critically analyze the capability, 
readiness, and feasibility of NYC first responders to effectively perform the task of 
sheltering-in-place. From a strategic point of view, the concept of sheltering-in-place is 
not new nor is it applicable only to radiological attacks. In theory, sheltering can be used 
at any hazardous materials incident in which persons will be less exposed remaining 
inside a building or other place of refuge than they would be outside its confines. It is 
commonly used as a temporary measure of protection until such time the hazardous 
substance has been accurately identified and the release has dissipated to a level that 
allows safe evacuation. It is also preferred when immediate evacuation is generally not 
feasible or desirable. For instance, complete evacuation of certain institutions such as 
jails, hospitals, and nursing homes creates operational problems for first responders for 
obvious reasons. Additionally, the sheer magnitude of a relatively large-scale incident 
could potentially overwhelm the available resources needed to effectively coordinate a 
mass evacuation effort. Therefore, it seems most logical that the universal guidance 
following a significant RDD attack, as previously shown by the various Web sites 
referenced in Table 3, instructs people outside of the immediate area of the explosion to 
seek shelter inside buildings. 
While sheltering-in-place clearly has its benefits for reducing the amount of 
personal exposure and contamination in the aftermath of an RDD attack, closer 
examination of this strategy reveals significant concerns and many unanswered questions. 
Is sheltering-in-place a feasible strategy for the densely-populated, high-rise building 
areas of Lower and/or Midtown Manhattan? Will the citizens follow the instructions 
given by public officials and first responders?  Do NYC first responder agencies have 
enough capability and resources to effectively coordinate the search, rescue, fire 
suppression, monitoring, sheltering, evacuation, and decontamination operations? Is there 
a sheltering-in-place plan in place and is it practiced? This chapter will identify the 
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problems posed by these questions, particularly as it relates to the borough of Manhattan, 
and offer realistic recommendations for the benefit of NYC’s first responder agencies. 
2. Key Assumptions 
Since many unpredictable variables would ultimately affect the outcome, there is 
no way to determine with any degree of exactness the hazardous conditions that would 
likely result from a dirty bomb attack.125 However, for the purpose of determining how 
well prepared NYC will be in the event such an attack takes place, certain underlying 
assumptions must be made. The radiological attack scenario outlined in the draft version 
of the National Planning Scenarios provides detailed information on what local, State, 
and Federal governments could expect following a dirty bomb attack against a moderate-
to-large city.126 With respect to the potential impact on sheltering-in-place decisions, 
some of the more applicable postulations are as follows: 
• Radioactive contamination is found inside and outside of buildings over an 
area of approximately thirty-six city blocks; 
• The entire scene is contaminated with 137Cs (cesium chloride), though not 
at levels impeding the operations of first responders; 
• Roughly 180 people are killed and 270 injured people require medical 
assistance as a result of the explosion; 
• Approximately 20,000 people may require monitoring for radiation and 
possible decontamination; 
• Most of the subway system is contaminated; 
• Wind patterns carry the radioactive material in random directions, creating 
numerous radioactive “hot spots;” 
• Negative pressure draws contaminated air into buildings via cracks around 
windows and doors, and air intakes increase contamination inside larger 
buildings; 
• Radioactive plume dispersion continues for 20 minutes before particles 
have fully settled.127 
Although the planning scenario mentioned above specifies that 25,000 persons 
will be given sheltering-in-place instructions, if an RDD event were to take place in a 
                                                 
125 Medalia, “Terrorist ‘Dirty Bombs’,” 3. 




densely populated area in Manhattan it should be expected that this number would be of 
an order of magnitude several times greater. 
3. Public Reaction to Instructions 
When devising and implementing sheltering-in-place plans it is important to take 
into consideration just how the general public would react to instructions for remaining in 
a nearby building following an RDD attack. A recent behavioral study and public survey 
conducted by the New York Academy of Medicine on this issue reveals some interesting 
data that could be of particular use to public safety officials and first responders.128 Most 
notably, it found that only 59 % of the public would remain inside when told by officials 
instructing them to do so (Figure 1). For emergency personnel responding to an RDD 
attack along the magnitude outlined in the National Planning Scenarios, the strategic 
implications surrounding these findings are quite significant. It should be anticipated that 
not only would tens of thousands of NYC citizens be exposed to the harmful effects of 
radiation, but first responders would also be blocked from entering the incident scene 
during the critical initial stages of the emergency operation.129 Dealing with scores of 
narrowly-spaced, densely-populated high-rise office buildings will present considerable 
operational challenges for NYC’s first responder agencies, particularly in light of the 
multifarious factors put forth in the RDD scenario. 
Meanwhile, in what appears to be a reasonable opportunity for remedying the 
relative disregard of official instruction, the New York Academy of Medicine study finds 
that there are measures that can be taken to improve upon these numbers. According to 
the survey, the number of people cooperating with official sheltering instructions would 
increase to 74% if one or more of the following conditions were met: 
• If they were able to communicate with people they care about via 
telephone or e-mail; 
• If they weren’t able to communicate but knew the people they cared for 
would be well taken care of for at least three days; 
• If they knew that there were plans in place to keep them safe and fed in the 
building that they were sheltering in.130 
                                                 
128 Lasker, “Redefining Readiness,” 31-42. 
129 Ferguson, Four Faces, 308. 
130 Lasker, “Redefining Readiness,” 33-35. 
56 
 




(From: Lasker, “Redefining Readiness,” 32.) 
 
However, given the vastness and complexity of Manhattan’s urban environment, 
fulfilling these personal needs without proper pre-planning would prove to be exigent. 
The task would basically entail convincing building management, and its personnel, that 
their occupancies could potentially be used as a “safe haven.”131 Since mandating 
regulatory guidance on these matters would likely be politically unfeasible, these 
conditions would best be addressed by a “best practices” public/private sector planning 
effort; one that involves collaborative participation on behalf of NYC’s first responder 
agencies, building management, and the general public. A viable option would be to 
promote the adoption of these concepts along with the official release of the recently 




                                                 
131 Lasker, “Redefining Readiness,” 41. 
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prepare an Emergency Action Plan (EAP). It is worth noting that, in addition to a site-
specific evacuation plan, this rule requires that a provision be made within the EAP for 
sheltering-in-place.132 
Perhaps the most significant factor brought out in the study is the fact that the 
group of respondents residing in NYC were found to be less inclined to be cooperative 
than the other people surveyed.133 The infamous order given to the victims at the WTC 
on 9/11 to remain in the building is cited as the reason for this inconsistency. Not 
surprisingly, since 9/11 the phenomenon of en-masse self-evacuation has been seen at 
relatively minor operations in which the occupants of the building were neither officially 
ordered out nor were presented with imminently perilous conditions.134 The general 
public’s bias toward immediate evacuation underscores the importance of 
institutionalizing the concept of sheltering-in-place and ensuring that the public is fully 
informed of the details of such plans. Hence, the study accurately concludes that “The 
public’s full cooperation in the dirty bomb situation could be increased substantially by 
developing sheltering-in-place plans in the places people frequently are in and making 
people very aware of those plans; by strengthening people’s confidence in community 
preparedness plans; and by enhancing people’s trust in official instructions and 
actions.”135 
4. First Responder Guidance 
Given all of the above assumptions, it appears that the strategy of sheltering-in-
place, as it applies to NYC, presents first responders with a daunting task. This is 
especially true in light of the most up-to-date information available on the early 
emergency response to an explosive RDD. As part of a recent DHS-sponsored 
“playbooks” project, a leading health physicist from Brookhaven National Labs proposes 
                                                 
132 The proposed FDNY rule provides that “The sheltering in place provisions of the Emergency 
Action Plan shall be based on an analysis of the circumstances in which such action would best ensure the 
safety of building occupants, and the manner in which it could be best implemented in the building.” New 
York City Fire Department, “Office Building Emergency Action Plans,” 3 RCNY §6-02 (2005): 9, 
http://nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/rcny/rcny_6_02_proposed_rule.pdf. (accessed December 10, 2005). 
133 Lasker, “Redefining Readiness,” 37. 
134 In 2004, the author had personally experienced the early self-evacuation of a high-rise office 
building at an emergency operation involving a relatively minor fire located in an adjacent sidewalk 
transformer vault. 
135 Lasker, “Redefining Readiness,” 37. 
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numerous event-specific countermeasures and operational guidance relating to RDD 
preparedness.136 Some of the more useful information provided by the project that would 
factor into the sheltering-in-place/evacuation decisions of NYC’s first responder agencies 
is summarized as follows: 
• The area of highest concern is limited to within 500 meters of the blast 
location. 
• The primary exposure routes are from groundshine137 (external) and 
material on skin and clothes. The exposure hazard due to inhalation is not 
as significant. 
• The potential inhalation dose comes from the passing plume, which in the 
area of highest concern is gone within ten minutes. 
• First responders should be primarily concerned with protecting the public 
from groundshine, providing guidance on decontamination, and 
addressing the inhalation hazard. 
•  Sheltering in large buildings offers substantial protection from 
groundshine. 
• Since timing the passage of the plume is a complicated process, sheltering 
to protect against the lesser inhalation hazard is more difficult to achieve. 
• Although exposure to groundshine is reduced by quick evacuation, this 
may be difficult in a dense urban environment. Quickly identifying 
“hotspots” could prove useful during evacuation. 
• Although some people close to the release may require prompt 
decontamination, urgent decontamination is not needed in the majority of 
cases. 
• The inhalation exposure can be reduced 10 times with improvised 
respiratory protection (i.e. dry handkerchief). 
• If the number of evacuees is very large, do not plan to perform mass 
decontamination. 
• Allow self-evacuees to go home and remove and bag outer clothing before 
entering their home. 
• All strategies involving evacuation, sheltering, phased evacuation, or any 
logical combination thereof will reduce exposure. 
                                                 
136 Musolino, “Emergency Response Guidance,” and Harper, “Realistic Hazard Boundaries.” It is 
important to note that at the time of this writing the information provided by Dr. Musolino has not been 
officially issued by DHS. 
137 Groundshine, as referred to in this context, is the radiation emitted from radioactive debris 
deposited on the ground following the RDD explosion. 
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From the pragmatic point of view of a first responder, the above guidance is 
largely reasonable and strategically necessary. It is sound, straightforward, and lends well 
to the development of a logical NYC-specific plan for sheltering-in-place. However, 
certain issues are seemingly inconsistent and need to be clarified prior to any 
implementation. For instance, the proposed recommendation for “allowing” potentially 
contaminated citizens to go home appears problematic given the traditional mission of 
public safety agencies; especially since the directions also rationally call for prompt 
decontamination of persons close to the release. Absent proper monitoring with the 
Ludlum 2241 survey meter (see Chapter IV), there is virtually no way to determine the 
extent of contamination on any particular person or group. Hence, providing such blanket 
permission for self-evacuees conceivably could permit severely contaminated civilians to 
remain dangerously exposed, creating the potential for incurring additional harm and 
inadvertent exposure to others. Since protection from groundshine, not the inhalation 
hazard, seems to be the main concern and the best countermeasure for this hazard is to 
shelter people in large buildings, it would make the most sense for public safety officials 
and first responders to discourage civilians from going home, at least until adequate 
resources are on the scene to permit safe, orderly, and efficient evacuation. 
According to the parameters laid out in the recently issued CIMS protocol, and in 
fulfillment of its core competency for life safety operations at radiological events, the 
FDNY is responsible for making all tactical decisions regarding structural evacuation 
(which includes sheltering-in-place). With the exception of some subtle discrepancies, 
currently proposed FDNY protocols for sheltering-in-place/evacuation in response to an 
RDD attack are largely consistent with the recommendations proposed by the DHS 
playbooks project. Perhaps the most significant and notable divergence is that the FDNY 
has no provision for allowing self –evacuated, exposed victims to go home. 
A draft version of the FDNY’s plan for radiological operations provides that 
sheltering-in-place: is a viable option for protection of civilians outside of the immediate 
vicinity of the release; is generally not appropriate when high doses of radiation are 
projected; and may be a temporary action of choice if rapid evacuation is impeded.138 On 
                                                 
138 New York City Fire Department, “Fire Tactics and Procedures, Emergency Response Plan: 
Addendum 3, Radiological Operations,” Draft Version (June 2005): 14-18. 
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the other hand, it states that evacuation: may provide total protection from airborne 
release if completed before plume arrival; may increase exposure if performed during 
plume passage, and is appropriate for protection from high exposure rates due to 
groundshine. Equally important, the bulletin proposes that responding personnel should 
ensure that victims are directed to a Safe Refuge Area (SRA) and assessed for 
contamination. However, it does not make a distinction between victims that would have 
already self-evacuated prior to the first responders arrival and those that would be 
evacuated by emergency personnel on the scene. Hence, judging from the general bias of 
the DHS and FDNY directions, it can be expected that the NYC agency most responsible 
for life safety is poised to incorporate the strategy of sheltering-in-place as a way of 
accomplishing its mission. 
5. FDNY Sheltering-in-Place Survey 
Since proposed guidance advocates the value of a sheltering-in-place strategy 
during the emergency response phase of an RDD event, logic dictates the necessity to 
closely examine how smoothly such an operation would be in the areas most likely to be 
attacked: Lower and/or Midtown Manhattan. In view of the fact that it is not possible to 
re-create the exact conditions that would result in a disaster on the scale put forth by the 
National Planning Scenarios, it is difficult to predict precisely how NYC’s first 
responder agencies would manage the sheltering-in-place aspect of the operation. In an 
attempt to get a clearer picture of just how well the most vulnerable areas of NYC would 
fare given official instructions to sheltering-in-place, a basic survey of the FDNY Chief 
Officers most likely to be tasked with making the tactical decisions at an RDD incident 
could provide insight into the practicability of the recommended strategy. 
In October, 2005, a survey was conducted with the purpose of determining from a 
first responder’s perspective the feasibility for sheltering-in-place for a dirty bomb 
terrorist attack in NYC, and the areas of Downtown (response area of FDNY Division 1) 
or Midtown (response area of FDNY Division 3) Manhattan in particular. The survey 
group included FDNY Chief Officers holding the ranks of Battalion Chief and Deputy 
Chief, and assigned either to Division 1, Division 3, or Haz-Mat Operations. Out of the 
72 sent, a total of 46 Chief Officers responded to the survey, a participation rate of 64%. 
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In order to establish baseline input into the decision making process, background 
information in the form of a scenario was included in the survey utilizing information 
from the DHS playbooks project, the New York Academy of Medicine study, and the 
CIMS protocol. Meanwhile, the survey also made the aforementioned key assumptions 
(see subsection 2 earlier in this chapter), conditions taken largely from the RDD scenario 
depicted in the National Planning Scenarios. The respondents were then asked how the 
FDNY would best handle three emergency response tasks relating to its core 
competencies, and how it pertained to the scenario given, namely: 
1. evacuation of civilians from all buildings within the 500 meter radius of 
the dirty bomb explosion; 
2. decontamination of up to 20,000 civilians following the dirty bomb 
explosion; 
3. sheltering-in-place of civilians inside buildings within the contaminated 36 
block area. 
Additionally, they were asked to make an assessment of the FDNY’s capacity for 
handling these tasks alone versus utilizing the assistance of the NYPD or mutual aid 
resources. 
As shown by Chart 1, the results clearly indicate the difficulty the FDNY would 
experience handling each of these tasks with only its own resources. Assistance from the 
NYPD was cited by the majority of respondents in evacuation (72%), decontamination 
(50%), and sheltering-in-place (93%). Comparing each task to the other, it can be 
surmised that the respondents were more apt to believe that the NYPD was needed most 
for the task of sheltering-in-place (93%). Moreover, when asked more specifically about 
the task for which the NYPD would be best deployed, the respondents more widely 
decided on sheltering-in-place (41%) over force protection (19%), crowd control (19%), 
area access control (15%), rescue and removal (7%), and decontamination (0%). Even 
though it was found that the NYPD should assist with the evacuation task in general, 
more than one-half (51%) believed that NYPD units would best be deployed outside the 
immediate 500 meter area of the dirty bomb explosion until all life safety operations were 




the assistance of mutual aid for all three tasks, pre-planning for any role these resources 
would play in response to a call for support should be limited to tasks not related to the 
event itself. 
 

























































From a purely statistical standpoint, it is quite evident that the critical tasks 
needed to meet the challenges of a major RDD attack in NYC would entail a 
comprehensive inter-agency response, in particular the use of the NYPD to assist the 
FDNY with sheltering-in-place. Unfortunately, however, the data also reveals that the 
inter-agency component of the operation would be enormously problematic. When asked 
if the inter-agency response to a dirty bomb attack would be well controlled and 
coordinated, more than three-quarters (78%) of the respondents disagreed (Chart 2). 
Lending more credence to this perceived shortcoming is the fact that not a single person 
in the entire group responded in the affirmative. Evidently, the recently instituted NYC-
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specific, incident management protocol could be one of the underlying reasons for this 
sentiment. The vast majority of respondents (71%) believed that CIMS did not provide 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities for response to a dirty bomb attack (Chart 3). 
 
Chart 2.   NYC inter-agency response to a dirty bomb attack 









Chart 3.   CIMS protocol provides clearly defined roles and 









Although CIMS protocol clarification is undoubtedly a policy that must be 
readdressed, the survey further illustrates that it is neither the lone nor the main issue 
surrounding the anticipated lack of inter-agency coordination. As demonstrated in Chart 
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4, inadequate inter-agency training (40%), lack of an RDD-specific inter-agency response 
plan (30%), and inadequate communication (21%) were all cited as being perhaps 
presenting the greatest challenge to NYC first responder agencies in the dirty bomb 
scenario. But, it is important to point out that it cannot be determined from the survey 
exactly how the political ramifications (discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII) leading 
up to and following the protocol development have influenced any such existing inter-
agency training, planning, and communications policy decisions. In any case, Charts 5 
and 6 show that nearly all respondents believe inter-agency coordination and control 
could be improved with more realistic inter-agency training (98%) and an RDD-specific, 
inter-agency response plan (92%). This high level of acceptance may indicate a 
willingness on behalf of at least this group of high-ranking FDNY Chief Officers to 
participate in any prospective inter-agency initiatives proposed in the future. 
 
 Chart 4.   The greatest challenge facing the FDNY and NYPD in 
regards to a coordinated and controlled inter-agency response to 

















Finally, 76% of the respondents believed that the sheltering-in-place of civilians 
could be best coordinated and controlled by collectively employing all of the following: 
1. Assigning sheltering-in-place responsibilities to FDNY units as part of life 
safety operations; 
2. Assigning  sheltering-in-place responsibilities to the NYPD as part of 
perimeter security; 
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3. Relying on public information provided by government officials (i.e. NYC 
OEM) at the time of the event; 
4. Educating building management and the general public on proper 
sheltering-in-place procedures prior to the actual event. 
 
Chart 5.   Inter-agency response to a dirty bomb attack 
could be better coordinated and controlled with more 








Chart 6.   Inter-agency reponse to a dirty bomb attack 
could be better coordinated and controlled with an RDD-









In order to increase the awareness and confidence of the general public, NYC 
office building management should include in its site-specific sheltering-in-place plans 
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provisions to maintain the basic needs of occupants: communications, security, food and 
water. These plans should also include contingencies for providing additional capacity for 
pedestrians directed to seek shelter inside nearby buildings. So that first responders can 
become more familiar with the process, procedures should be implemented that require 
FDNY and NYPD units to be on hand at the periodic, full building EAP drills.139 As 
explained in Chapter V, the efficacy of these measures could also be reinforced during a 
proposed public/private sector NYC Public Safety/Terrorism Preparedness Week 
initiative. 
NYC first responder agencies must address the issue of self-evacuees. Without 
question, it would be impossible to account for and isolate every contaminated person 
pending monitoring, decontamination, and medical treatment; however, it would be 
irresponsible to not develop a plan to do so. Some entirely feasible tactics have been 
offered as possible solutions. For example, strategically-located buildings could be 
mapped-out and then identified as either shelters or decontamination facilities; and pre-
designated monitoring and decontamination stations or “pinch points” could be 
established on the Brooklyn, Queens, and Bronx sides of bridges and tunnels.140 Most 
importantly, the location of these sites should be made known to all potential first 
responding Incident Commanders prior to the event occurring so that this information 
could become part of their own pre-planning efforts. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle that needs to be overcome is each NYC first 
responder agency not knowing exactly what the other will be responsible for. An RDD-
specific inter-agency response plan should be developed that delineates which agency 
will be responsible for evacuation and which will be responsible sheltering-in-place; and 
that takes into account the current inventory of resources available for monitoring and 
decontamination. Once devised, the plan must be realistically practiced by mandating 
scenario-based, inter-agency drills that are followed up with candid inter-agency 
                                                 
139 The proposed FDNY rule provides that “All building occupants shall participate simultaneously in 
an EAP drill at least once every two years. Such drill shall be based on a specific emergency scenario, 
which shall be announced at the time of the drill, and shall include a sheltering in place, invacuation and/or 
partial evacuation.” FDNY, “Office Building Emergency Action Plans,” 21. 
140 Anonymous. This particular information was provided by a highly-trained expert on hazardous 
materials response in the “additional comments” section of the survey. The instructions related to the 
sheltering-in-place survey stipulated an assurance of confidentiality. 
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critiques. The end result of these recommended steps will be more coordinated inter-
agency communications, more efficient use of resources, and less duplication of effort. 
7. Conclusion 
An unprecedented dirty bomb attack on Manhattan could potentially result in 
numerous hazardous conditions and many more unknown variables, especially given the 
unpredictability of the general public in response to official instructions. Using the 
National Planning Scenarios as a guide, the assumptions made in its RDD scenario 
would certainly task the current preparedness efforts of NYC’s first responder agencies. 
Although much has already been done in the way of equipment and capability, a few 
basic and low cost strategic initiatives can increase NYC’s readiness. 
Both Federal and local first responder guidance has shown that sheltering-in-place 
is a necessary aspect of any potential RDD response. Moreover, as explicated in Chapter 
V, many emergency response Web sites provide the general public with at least some 
basic, albeit conflicting, guidance for sheltering-in-place. A poll conducted of high-
ranking FDNY officials has demonstrated that their department’s resources alone would 
be overwhelmed given the scenario proposed by current Federal guidelines. It also found 
that sheltering-in-place would be better coordinated if RDD planning and training was 
more realistic and it involved inter-agency collaboration. Since fostering inter-agency 
command and cooperation is critical for maintaining control during the aftermath of an 
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VII. INTER-AGENCY COMMAND, CONTROL, AND 
COOPERATION 
A. CITYWIDE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIMS) POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
1. Introduction 
Arguably one of the more controversial case studies on the topic of law 
enforcement in homeland security is the matter of incident command in NYC, and the 
relationship between the FDNY and NYPD. Largely the result of a few well-publicized 
confrontations, local media has portrayed a picture of on-going hostility and tension 
between these two agencies. However, contrary to popular belief, inter-agency 
cooperation has been much better than the critics report. 
It is worth noting that senior-level officials from both agencies have mostly 
dismissed these reports as isolated quarrels involving personnel who had exercised poor 
judgment; and they suggest that this type of behavior does not take place on a daily basis. 
In fact, nearly all previous conflicts have occurred at those response operations where 
emergency services were duplicated and responsibility was not well-defined. The great 
majority of these were relatively small in scale, and the disputes were resolved either at 
the incident scene or by the respective departmental disciplinary processes. 
Yet, it is unrealistic to deny that underlying FDNY/ NYPD inter-agency problems 
do not exist. For example, the lack of command, control, and coordination on 9/11 was 
evidenced by two separate command posts and a failure to communicate with each 
other.141  It is accurately reported that this problem was ultimately a by-product of a 
cultural barrier created by operational stove-pipes rather than an overt lack of 
cooperation. Prior to 9/11, even though there was an inter-agency response plan in effect, 
training for large-scale catastrophic events rarely took place. Hence, this is precisely why 
each agency operated autonomously; they knew no other way. 
The NYC OEM has proactively decided that these coordination issues are best 
resolved at the policy level, and has requested input from high-ranking officials from all 
                                                 
141 For example, see Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, 9/11 Commission Report, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 321. 
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first responder agencies. A CIMS protocol has been proposed to clarify the roles played 
by these agencies for responding to any conceivable type of incident, large or small. 
Unfortunately, it has proven to be complicated and confusing, and a poorly designed 
policy for CBRN/Haz-Mat emergency management.142 
2. Historical Background 
In May, 2004, in preparation for the arrival of the 9/11 Commission, NYC OEM 
unveiled a draft copy of CIMS. This document was touted as the blueprint for NYC’s 
emergency response plan, thus meeting the Federally-mandated requirement to receive 
homeland security funding. Over the ensuing several months, all concerned agencies 
were given several opportunities to provide feedback on the draft to the NYC OEM and 
cite their own concerns and objections. 
A critical point of contention between the FDNY and NYPD was the portion of 
the protocol relating to CBRN/Haz-Mat responses. The initial draft designated the NYPD 
to remain in charge as the sole Incident Commander (IC) at all CBRN/Haz-Mat incidents 
where crime or terrorism was suspected or had occurred; and only until it was determined 
by them not to be the case, the incident would then be managed under a unified 
command.143 Hence, the NYPD had successfully persuaded the NYC OEM, and city hall, 
that only they should take initial command of these incidents. They argued that NYC was 
different than any other place in the country because intelligence reports had shown that 
the terrorist threat was greatest here, and that the NYPD has largest police department in 
the country.144 
The FDNY cited the following in opposition to the CBRN/Haz-Mat section of the 
final draft: 
• It is logically flawed; 
• It is inconsistent with other protocols in CIMS; 
• It contradicts the basic principles of the Incident Command System (ICS) 
and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) which are used as 
best practices throughout the country; 
                                                 
142 Peter E. Hayden (FDNY Chief of Department), in testimony to the City Council, May 9, 2005. 
143 New York City Office of Emergency Management, “Citywide Incident Management System,” 
Annex A (April 6, 2005): 3. 
144 Raymond Kelly (NYPD Commissioner), in testimony to the City Council, May 9, 2005. 
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• It disregards the FDNY’s proven expertise in Haz-Mat incident 
management; 
• It could be a potential drain on City resources. 
A back-and-forth process continued numerous times, with disagreements 
remaining primarily on the CBRN/Haz-Mat incident command issue. Finally, much to 
the dismay of the City Council who had been carefully overseeing the development 
process for several years, the CIMS protocol was signed by Mayor Bloomberg and placed 
into effect on April 6, 2005. 
Obviously displeased with this decision, the City Council had subpoenaed FDNY 
Chief of Department Peter Hayden to testify and the debate finally came to a culmination 
on May 9, 2005. At the highly-publicized joint oversight hearing of the City Council 
Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services and the Committee on Public Safety, 
the City Council had determined that the CBRN/Haz-Mat section of the CIMS protocol 
was an ill-advised policy, and thus, the long-awaited inter-agency collaborative effort 
proposed by the NYC OEM had “flopped.”145 By the time all the testimony was 
presented it was quite evident that the CIMS protocol had, in effect, turned into a struggle 
for control with the influence of the NYPD outweighing that of the FDNY. 
3. Pros 
The following items represent the advantages to using the NYPD as the Incident 
Commander in a CBRN/Haz-Mat Single Command structure: 
1. Potential Detection and Interdiction: NYC is unique in the sense that the 
majority of terror plots against the City had been planned for the relatively small 
geographic area of the borough of Manhattan. In fact, many consequence management 
planning models and scenarios use this region as the backdrop for the after-effects of a 
CBRN attack.  The significant threat and vulnerability related to this type of attack has 
prompted the installation of chemical, biological, and radiation detectors near certain 
critical locations throughout Manhattan.146 As technology improves and sophisticated 
equipment becomes more readily available, the NYPD could conceivably receive an early 
                                                 
145 Yvette Clark (Council Member and chair person), in testimony to the City Council, May 9, 2005, 
http://www.nyccouncil.info/pdf_files/newswire/05_09_05_cims.pdf (accessed on August 27, 2005). 
146 Ruth interview. 
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warning as to the presence of these weapons. NYPD counter-terrorism officials would 
then be well-positioned to take command and control of the ensuing preventive operation. 
2. Crime Scene Investigation and Site Management: The quick identification 
of the terrorists responsible for the Madrid rail system bombings underscores the 
importance of a timely criminal investigation. As one NYPD union official notes, 
“Treating [CBRN/Haz-Mat] as law enforcement keeps the City safe because the NYPD is 
not just focused on the hazardous substance but also is using its intelligence and 
investigative resources to identify the perpetrators and thereby prevent future events.”147 
The objectives of overall site management and perimeter, traffic, and crowd control are 
also included as important law enforcement functions in this segment of the NYPD’s 
emergency response. 
3. Force Protection and Site Safety: History has shown that terrorists have 
used the tactics of near-simultaneous attacks and secondary devices with the intention of 
targeting first responders. When the type of attack also includes CBRN, the potential 
consequences could become even more lethal. Thus, any counter-terrorism plan should 
include measures by law enforcement agencies to ensure that the incident is safe and 
secure. A strong command presence by the NYPD would protect on-going life safety and 
investigative operations. 
4. Cons 
The following items represent the disadvantages to not using the FDNY as an 
Incident Commander in a Unified Command structure: 
1. Haz-Mat and Incident Command Expertise: In every major city 
throughout the U.S. the fire department is placed in command at Haz-Mat incidents 
primarily because they possess highly specialized equipment and employ the most 
qualified and experienced personnel. However, under CIMS, NYC is also the only 
jurisdiction in the Nation where command of a CBRN/Haz-Mat incident is entrusted 
solely to the police department. This is in spite of the fact that, historically, 99.9 percent 
of all Haz-Mat incidents in NYC have not involved crime or terrorism. In 2004, an 
FDNY Chief Officer was the lone IC at 95 percent of the Haz-Mat incidents to which 
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FDNY Haz-Mat Co. #1 had responded, many of which were large-scale. In contrast, the 
NYPD had been the IC at only a relatively few, small-scale “white-powder” anthrax 
threats. Hence, it is quite clear that CIMS does not fully utilize the FDNY’s incident 
command expertise in Haz-Mat operations. 
2. National Incident Management System (NIMS) Inconsistencies: Unlike 
CIMS, NIMS does not imply that incidents be managed based solely upon potential 
criminal acts. On the contrary, it states that incidents involving CBRN “represent 
particular challenges for the ICS structure.”148 It further provides for a unified command 
structure at incidents involving many different agencies from a single jurisdiction.149 
Since major CBRN/Haz-Mat events in NYC would almost always involve a multi-agency 
response, it would be most logical and advantageous to operate under a unified 
command. 
3. Command and Control Issues: Perhaps the most compelling argument 
against the CIMS protocol is provided by FDNY Chief of Department Pete Hayden. In 
reference to his “vision of the future” he states, 
Public safety is directly connected to the systematic development of a 
unified command at major, complex incidents and [the] building of [a] 
mutual system of respectful interaction with each other. Unless our public 
service organizations can be integrated into a unified command group 
during terrorist events, where decisions are made with full awareness of 
the capacities and talents of each of the relevant groups, we are likely to 
repeat the mistakes of limiting command capacity at the most important 
times in the lives of the communities we have pledged to serve.150 
4. Information Sharing Issues:  As evidenced on 9/11, information sharing is 
a critical aspect of any major inter-agency emergency operation. For example, Chief 
Hayden points to the fact that information reported by the NYPD aviation unit that the 
top 15 floors of the North tower may collapse was never transferred to FDNY 
commanders. Hence, he portends that “Both organizations developed blind spots that 
reduced their own capacity to command…We cannot afford this to happen again.”151  
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Meanwhile, citing reports from the FBI that a second plane was heading for Washington, 
D.C., the IC at the Pentagon operation found that “the unified command approach 
ensured that all responders received important information throughout the critical first 
hours of the response.”152 
5. Political Ramifications 
Upon review of the initial draft of the CIMS protocol in May, 2004 the 9/11 
Commission had found that, “[CIMS] does not mandate a comprehensive and unified 
incident command… In our judgment, this falls short of an optimal response plan, which 
requires clear command and control, common training, and the trust that such training 
creates.”153 More recently, 9/11 Commission panel member Slade Gorton had expressed 
his displeasure with the arrangement in a statement given to the NY Post following his 
testimony to the City Council. Thus, by designating the NYPD ranking officer as the lone 
IC at CBRN/Haz-Mat incidents, the Mayoral-approved CIMS document disregards a 
critical recommendation made by this influential committee. As recent media coverage 
regarding the CIMS versus NIMS controversy suggests, this could prove to be a political 
“football” if future incidents lead to inter-agency conflicts. 
Despite the aforementioned inconsistency, the CIMS protocol has apparently been 
approved by the DHS NIMS Integration Center.154 This is an extremely important 
endorsement since eligibility for future Federal funding is contingent upon NIMS 
compliance. It is even more important politically to Mayor Bloomberg, an outspoken 
critic on the current formula used to dole out homeland security funding. This has 
prompted him to go on record and forcefully state, “We’ve made the decision. And now 
everybody is going to get on board and make that decision work.”155 
6. Policy Recommendations 
1. Conduct Quarterly Inter-agency Review Meetings: Although CIMS 
provides for a joint after-action review, it is only conducted upon request of an agency or 
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if recommended by the NYC OEM. The FDNY has proactively instituted a CIMS After-
Action Report (AAR) system to document all noteworthy inter-agency emergency 
operations. It is suggested that NYPD do the same. These reports should then be 
addressed on a quarterly basis by a joint after-action review team. In effect, this will 
settle any and all disagreements before they lead to a lack of confidence and mistrust. 
2. Increase the Role of the NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM):  
It became evident at the City Council oversight hearing that if NYC’s first responder 
agencies could not agree to a workable strategic document under normal circumstances, it 
is unlikely that they will be able to do so at the time of an actual CBRN/Haz-Mat event. 
The on-scene NYC OEM representative should be empowered to clarify the inevitable 
confusion and settle incident command disputes. This would provide immediate 
accountability for CIMS compliance. 
3. Mandate Regular Inter-agency Training Using Incident Command System 
(ICS) Principles: CIMS provides for ICS training but does not specify its frequency. ICS 
is a tool, and like every piece of emergency equipment it needs to be checked periodically 
to ensure that it is functioning properly. An inter-agency training schedule should 
therefore be developed and strictly adhered to. 
4. Establish Parameters for Protocol Revision: As previously noted the 
principle of unified command for a multi-agency incident is clearly and indisputably the 
national standard. It has been suggested that the CIMS protocol is “a living program 
[which] will be updated in the future to reflect lessons learned…”156 It would therefore 
be beneficial, from both a public safety and political standpoint, for policymakers to set 
guidelines for a shift in that direction. 
7. Conclusion 
By its very nature, a terrorist attack involving a CBRN weapon will result in an 
extremely complex incident, one that will necessitate a well-coordinated and integrated 
response involving first responders from the NYPD and FDNY. As numerous experts 
have testified, a successful operation is predicated on the timely sharing of critical 
information and the sound and proven principles put forth by incident command system 
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standards. The essential law enforcement functions of responder protection, site security, 
and evidence collection should be carried out simultaneously with life safety operations 
under a unified command structure as provided for in NIMS. With these principles in 
mind, it is strongly recommended that NYC public safety officials prepare for the 
eventuality of a catastrophic CBRN event and take the necessary steps to revise various 





A. STRATEGIC PLAN – INCREASING NYC’S “DIRTY BOMB” 
PREPAREDNESS 
1. Specific Strategic Goal 
Whether it involves fighting fires, apprehending criminals or some other type of 
emergency response, the overarching mission for all first responder agencies is, first and 
foremost, to protect life and property. Since 9/11, prevention of, and response to, various 
types of terrorist attacks have been added to the top of this list of priorities. More 
specifically, the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) has identified 15 scenarios that all 
levels of government must prepare and plan for.157 An RDD attack is included as one of 
those; and because of its relatively high probability for occurrence, it is a threat that NYC 
public safety officials must immediately address. Therefore, the most effective strategic 
idea for increasing preparedness is to ensure that NYC first responder agencies’ improve 
upon several critical RDD counter-terrorism capabilities, and the corresponding task 
responsibilities, outlined in that important document. 
2. Fundamental Issues 
How can NYC adequately prepare for a “dirty bomb” attack? One widely-
recognized publication on the topic accurately suggests “To reduce the risks of this [type] 
of terrorism, efforts must be made to…devote adequate resources toward educating the 
public and preparing to manage the consequences of such an attack.”158  Fortunately, 
NYC’s first responder agencies are well-positioned to carry out these and other 
recommended tasks without detracting from their traditional duties. However, completion 
of each task will require a committed, collaborative effort between these public sector 
agencies and their private sector counterparts. Moreover, whereas increasing RDD 
preparedness will not require much in the way of capital investment; it will call for a shift 
in organizational culture and a change in leadership mind-set. 
The internal environment within the NYC first responder community is such that 
preparedness efforts have been significantly enhanced in certain respects, and hindered in 
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others. For example, both the FDNY and NYPD have been able to utilize additional 
Federal funding to bolster their equipment, technology and capability. This level of 
competency should go a long way toward satisfying the mandated RDD preparedness 
goal. However, the politically-motivated CIMS initiative has proven to be controversial 
and divisive. At any future RDD attack, this could potentially lead to command and 
control issues similar to those experienced on 9/11. 
The external factors affecting RDD preparedness are primarily related to the 
Federal requirements and the availability of additional funding. Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) – 8 states “Federal preparedness assistance will support 
State and local entities' efforts including planning, training, exercises, interoperability, 
and equipment acquisition for major events as well as capacity building for prevention 
activities such as information gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration related 
to terrorist attacks.”159 Given that NYC officials have spoken out repeatedly about the 
inequality of the current formula for homeland security funding allocation, first responder 
agency compliance with the provisions of the NPG should be a major motivating factor in 
planning. Because NYC is particularly vulnerable to an RDD attack, it should focus on 
the “risk-based target levels of capability” that are specifically applicable to that 
scenario.160 
By its very nature, preparedness for an RDD attack will encompass NYC’s first 
responder agencies core values of protecting of life and property. Although relatively few 
people would be killed by the immediate effects of radiation, the long term health effects 
on those unnecessarily exposed would be difficult to determine. It is this unknown risk 
and the public’s inherent fear of radiation that would cause wide-spread panic. 
Furthermore, since NYC, particularly the areas of Downtown or Midtown Manhattan, 
contains numerous key financial institutions and an abundance of highly-priced real 
estate, it is often referred to as the “Financial Capital of the World.” A successful RDD 
attack on the City would affect the local, regional, and national economies on a scale 
many times greater than 9/11. Hence, NYC public safety officials have a responsibility to 
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implement RDD-specific prevention and response strategies that could better prepare its 
first responders for protecting its citizens and preserving its critical infrastructure. 
The following key stakeholders have a particular interest in seeing that NYC 
enhances its RDD preparedness: 
• NYC citizens – A better prepared first responder work force will be able 
to better serve the people in the communities they are sworn to protect. 
• NYC first responders – As NYC employees, first responders are in a 
prime position to defend NYC and protect their own livelihoods. 
• Private sector entities – Working closely and collaboratively with private 
industry will ensure that the recommended public sector preparedness 
strategies are seamlessly implemented. 
• Regional communities – Surrounding jurisdictions largely depend on the 
economic strength and viability of the NYC economy. Also, regional 
collaboration is identified as a National Priority for achieving specified 
target capabilities.161 
• Federal, State, and local governments - As mentioned above, DHS is 
tasked with the implementation of HSPD-8 in order to support the 
preparedness efforts of the State and local governments. 
To obtain maximum effectiveness each one of these stakeholders must participate in 
carrying out the tasks and capabilities needed to achieve the goal of preparedness. 
3. New Lines of Business 
DHS has provided guidance on the preparedness requirements of HSPD-8 with 
the establishment of National Priorities.162 In full compliance with these priorities, the 
following new and existing strategies must be implemented by first responder agencies in 
order to increase NYC’s overall RDD preparedness: 
• Secure a commitment for the advancement of radiation detection 
technologies; 
• Institute a NYC Public Safety/Terrorism Preparedness and Education 
Campaign; 
• Develop an effective RDD-specific shelter-in-place plan for NYC; 
• Improve coordination and cooperation with more frequent and realistic 
inter-agency training, and continuous review of CIMS. 
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What is it that makes an RDD preparedness plan such a “valuable” strategy for 
NYC first responders? First, because subject matter experts have determined that an RDD 
attack is the type of WMD event most likely to occur in the relatively near future, the 
preparedness measures outlined above must be taken immediately. Next, preparing for 
RDD prevention and response, in order to protect the citizenry from its adverse health 
and economic effects, has overarching implications for many key stakeholders. Finally, a 
well-prepared cadre of first responders and a well-informed general public could 
conceivably deter terrorists from planning to strike NYC with this type of catastrophic 
attack. 
4. Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes 
To further implement the RDD strategic plan, it is necessary to closely examine 
the requirements of the capabilities-based NPG. The desired outcomes related to 
homeland security that NYC is supposed to achieve are delineated in the seven National 
Priorities. By comparison, each of the outcomes listed in the model shown in Figure 2 
can be categorized as being applicable to at least one of those seven listed in the NPG. 
 





(From: Harry P. Hatry, Performance Management: Getting Results [Washington, D.C.: 
Urban Institute Press, 1999], 33.) 
 
INPUTS OUTPUTS OUTCOMES
• accuracy of detection 
equipment 
• educational materials 
distributed 
• dedicated roles and 
responsibilities 
• number of training 
sessions held 
• number of policy 
meetings held 
• enhanced RDD 
prevention and response  
• greater RDD awareness 
and knowledge  
• decrease in unnecessary 
radiation exposure 




• advancement of radiation 
detection technologies 
• preparedness and education 
campaign 
• shelter-in-place plan  
• more frequent and realistic 
inter-agency training 





Since catastrophic terror attacks are extremely rare occurrences and, more 
specifically, an RDD attack has not yet occurred, measuring preparedness success by 
analyzing actual performance is not possible. However, general conclusions can be drawn 
on the overall commitment made to RDD preparedness by examining first responder 
agencies’ compliance with the following measurements of output: 
• a decrease in the number of false readings as indicated by laboratory 
testing of the various radiation detection devices in use; 
• the total number of “customers” in Manhattan reached with the message of 
RDD preparedness as indicated by surveys and poll numbers; 
• the development of an inter-agency shelter-in-place plan that is acceptable 
to all concerned parties; 
• the  total number of large-scale, inter-agency RDD training sessions held 
annually; 
• the total number of policy meetings on the effectiveness of the CIMS 
protocol held annually. 
5. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) 
In order to properly plan for an increase in RDD preparedness, it is helpful to 
perform a basic SWOT analysis (Figure 3) of NYC’s first responder agencies’ ability to 
prevent and respond to an attack. By taking into consideration the current internal and 
external environments affecting these agencies, specific conclusions can be drawn to 
address the strategic gaps that need to be filled. As Bryson notes, “[An] important 
outcome of a [SWOT] analysis may be specific actions to deal with challenges and 
weaknesses, build on strengths (including distinctive core competencies), and take 
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Four strategic issues emerge from the RDD preparedness SWOT analysis 
performed in Figure 3. Using a “direct approach” for identification purposes, they are: 164 
• What is the best use of the current radiation detection technology and how 
can the overall RDD prevention measures be improved? 
                                                 
164 Bryson, Strategic Planning, 161-166. 
Strengths 
• Largest first responder 
workforce in the Nation  
• Highly-dedicated and motivated 
workforce 
• Well-respected and trusted by 
the civilian population 
• Increased radiological-trained 
personnel  
• Enhanced radiation detection 
capabilities 
• Advanced incident management 
training 
Weaknesses 
• Insufficient inter-agency 
training 
• No inventory of radiation 
detection equipment and 
capabilities 
• Lack of an integrated, multi-
agency/jurisdictional response 
plan 
• No public awareness/education 
program 
• No shelter-in-place guidelines 
• Disagreement among agencies 
on current incident 
management guidelines  
Opportunities 
• Increase in Federal funding for 
prevention and response 
• More productivity from first 
responder agencies 
• More informed and responsive 
general public 
• Potential terrorist deterrent 
• Increase in the confidence of 
the business community 
• Local, regional, and national 
economic stability 
Threats 
• Political opposition 
• Status-quo leadership mindset 
• Differences in organizational 
culture 
• Uncommon missions 
• Deeply-entrenched “turf” issues 
• Lack of understanding of what 
the threat really is 
• Perception of the threat erodes  
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• How can NYC’s first responder agencies best relay critical information to 
the general public? 
• Is a sheltering-in-place strategy feasible given the current level of public 
awareness and inter-agency cooperation? 
• Can long-standing inter-agency issues surrounding command, control, and 
cooperation be overcome in order to develop a comprehensive, joint 
response plan? 
6. Benchmarking 
Arguably, the concept of “preparedness” is inherently subjective in nature. For 
example, it leads to the questions, “How do we know that we are prepared? How is 
preparedness measured?” Fortunately, the NPG has delineated that the Universal Task 
List (UTL) be used to help guide Federal, State, and local agencies through the 
prerequisites called for by DHS for achieving the preparedness standards for each of the 
15 planning scenarios. 
The UTL facilitates requirements analysis by providing a template and a 
list of possible tasks that serve as a starting point for assessing what is 
required to respond to an event. The training community can use it to 
assist in exercise design, to aid in prioritizing training needs, and to serve 
as a template for evaluation. During a response, the UTL serves as a tool a 
manager can use to help organize the effort.165 
Hence, the applicable sections of the UTL for the corresponding RDD scenario could be 
used as the benchmark to assess NYC’s level of preparedness. 
Because an RDD attack would certainly require a significant inter-agency and 
multi-jurisdictional response over a period of months, it would be extremely difficult to 
collectively quantify the tasks for each responding agency. However, since NYC’s first 
responder agencies would play a major role in the initial 24 hours, or Emergency Stage, 
of an RDD attack, it is necessary to benchmark their progress using an integrated 
approach. The NYC organizations that would have the most significant impact on the 
outcome of the emergency operation include the NYPD, FDNY, NYC OEM, DOHMH, 
and NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). 
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The criterion for data collection is laid out fairly extensively in the UTL. It is 
important to note that, while each task should be completed to the fullest extent possible, 
it is not logical to require that all involved agencies be responsible for participating in 
each one. In certain categories, a particular agency would have multiple roles, while in 
others no role at all. In those situations where it is unclear which agency would perform a 
specific task due to duplicative core competencies, an on-scene NYC OEM representative 
would resolve any discrepancy. For this reason, it would make the most sense to delegate 
to NYC OEM the responsibility for all data collection at an operation, drill, or training 
exercise. NYC OEM should be equally responsible for ensuring that each one of the 
required tasks as outlined on the UTL are carried out in an efficient and timely manner. 
This proposed benchmarking plan has not been agreed to or accepted in any way, 
shape, or form. Therefore, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness, it would be 
necessary to produce a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by all affected parties 
and sent to the Mayor’s office for approval. 
7. Implementing the Plan 
The one thing that is obviously clear when utilizing the UTL for meeting NYC’s 
RDD preparedness goals is that no one first responder agency can handle the entire 
mission alone. Since a successful and efficient conclusion to this seemingly daunting 
event will require an unprecedented inter-agency response, it will necessarily call for an 
unparalleled collaborative pre-planning effort on behalf of all the aforementioned 
stakeholders. However, the challenge in reaching the objective of “deterrence through 
preparedness” lies in removing organizational barriers with a “big picture” plan that will 
reduce casualties and saves lives. The solution to this problem is for leadership personnel 
from both public and private sector entities to develop a durable Integrated RDD 
Preparedness Plan that is carefully crafted in accordance with Federal and local 
guidelines. 
In order to “drive the plan” in the right direction, NYC’s first responder agencies 
should begin by analyzing the Target Capabilities List (TCL) of the NPG.166 Using the 
TCL in the RDD planning process would create “value” by providing policymakers with 
a guide to assess precisely which tasks specific agencies are capable of handling, and                                                  
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then identify the gaps and overlaps that exist. The initial objective would be to provide 
the citizens with the most protection and safety in the most cost-effective manner 
possible. 
Undoubtedly, this is the stage of the process that will be met with the most dissent 
and resistance. As a general rule, NYC public sector agencies have historically shown a 
resistance to change, especially when there is the perception that in doing so a certain 
degree of authority would be conceded. The strategy of implementing an Integrated RDD 
Preparedness Plan can be properly executed only if the following four key organizational 
hurdles are overcome – political, motivational, cognitive, and resource (Figure 4).167 
8. Strategic Initiatives 
The following four initiatives should be implemented by public and/or private 
sector leaders in order to overcome key organizational hurdles and further the 
development of the proposed Integrated RDD Preparedness Plan: 
1. Draft a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) requiring the participation of 
all first responder agencies in the development of a regional, inter-agency RDD 
preparedness plan. 
The first step is to finally put politics aside and require that leaders, both agency 
heads and union officials, formally acknowledge that each agency has an important role 
to play. Arguably, this concept may be thought of as overly simplified and otherwise 
already implemented; but, the reality of the situation is that NYC’s main first responder 
organizations, the FDNY and NYPD, have traditionally been reluctant to concede 
overlapping, task-specific areas of responsibility. From one mayoral administration to the 
next, lead roles have changed irrespective of the fact that the core competencies of each 
of these agencies have generally remained the same. Hence, as the federally-mandated 
requirements of DHS are imposed upon State and local jurisdictions, NYC’s first 
responder agencies should realize the gravity of the threat and seize the opportunity to 
fully agree to work collaboratively. They should formulate regional, inter-
agency/jurisdictional preparedness plans; not only for an RDD attack, but for each one of  
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the 15 planning scenarios. Without mandatory compliance with this first step, the 
political hurdle that has resulted in age-old cultural barriers and organizational stovepipes 
will never be overcome. 
 




(From: Kim, Blue Ocean Strategy, 150.) 
 
2. Develop collaborative programs that create opportunities for private sector 
entities to participate in public sector RDD preparedness planning. 
The second step is for public sector leaders to design programs that will motivate 
the preparedness efforts of the entire first responder workforce. Since a successful RDD 
attack would have far-reaching implications for the entire workforce in NYC, private 
sector leaders should be invited to play a key role in the both the prevention and response 


















private sector involvement would instill “disproportionate influence” on the public 
sector’s acceptance of the need for an increase in RDD preparedness.168 
The suggested programs are easily applied and relatively low cost.  Manufacturers 
of radiation detectors should regularly monitor and evaluate the practical use of these 
devices, and continually strive for improvements and technological advances. Security 
management personnel of large buildings and major corporations should be actively 
engaged in the development of a sheltering-in-place plan and public awareness/education 
campaign, and should encourage the participation of all affected employees. Local media 
should be involved and briefed on the critical importance of relaying proper information 
to the general public. Collectively, the implementation of these programs would result in 
a well-informed and actively engaged private sector workforce which, in turn, will 
effectually remove the motivational hurdle leading to overall RDD preparedness. 
3. Draft a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) requiring the participation 
of all first responder agencies in periodic RDD training exercises. 
The third step is for public sector leaders to agree to mandated periodic RDD 
drills and training exercises. In order for these NYC’s first responder agencies to fully 
comprehend their actual level of preparedness, it is vitally important that this training be 
realistic. In general, both the FDNY and NYPD are well-trained and highly-motivated 
public safety organizations, arguably among the most proficient in the Nation. Objective 
critiques of these RDD training exercises will reveal firsthand just how dependent each 
agency must be on each other given the eventuality of an actual attack. Conceivably, 
these agencies would acknowledge the need for more collaboration, and jump the 
cognitive hurdle toward the strategic goal of increased preparedness. 
If resistance is met while drafting this MOU, it would be helpful to have all high-
level NYC public safety officials meet as a group in one room to view the Home Box 
Office (HBO) docudrama “Dirty War.” Widely recognized as being a real-life depiction 
of an actual RDD attack on the city of London, this film would likely create a powerful 
impact in the minds of those in the position of making strategic decisions. As 
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unconventional a tactic as this may seem, it could be exactly what is needed to change the 
leadership mind-set regarding NYC’s preparedness for this type of event. 
4. Develop and adopt a NYC-specific, inter-agency RDD response plan.169 
The fourth and final step is for public sector leaders to create a City-wide database 
of RDD response capability, and devise an inter-agency response plan based upon the 
current pool of resources. Since 9/11, many counter-terrorism measures have been taken 
in NYC with respect to equipment, technology, and capability; however, that is only “half 
the battle.” At this point it is unclear exactly how many trained personnel from the 
various agencies (FDNY, NYPD, and DOHMH) are equipped with how much and which 
types of radiation detection equipment. 
Every year each one of these agencies invests heavily in radiation training and 
equipment without knowing the others capabilities and with no idea if it is, or is not, in 
fact sufficient enough. A unified response plan based upon identified levels of equipment 
and training would reduce duplication of effort, meet the DHS requirement of building 
regional capability, and allow leaders to redirect scarce resources. Once a determination 
is made, more capital could then be devoted to cutting-edge radiation detection 
technologies and periodic full-scale inter-agency training exercises. Thus, an inter-agency 
response plan would allow policymakers to remove the commonly problematic resource 
hurdle by efficiently diverting Federal funding from the duplicative resource “cold spots” 
to the innovative resource “hot spots.”170 
9. Alternatives 
A viable alternative to the preceding set of recommendations would be to create a 
new, independent NYC Office of Homeland Security. In a city with a population of 
roughly 8 million people, and a first responder workforce comprised of 37,000 and 
13,000 employees in the NYPD and FDNY respectively, the sheer number of people to 
protect, and resources to manage, certainly justifies the establishment of a new 
bureaucracy. Minimally staffed by impartial and non-affiliated homeland security 
experts, one principal mission of this new organization would be to develop, implement, 
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and exercise strategies that would ensure NYC is fully prepared for an RDD attack, and 
the other scenarios specified in the UTL. This Office would be tasked with providing the 
“big picture” oversight that is necessary to develop collaborative best practices for the 
public and private sector, and making certain that all Federal requirements are met. In 
essence, it would act as the facilitator responsible for removing the aforementioned 
organizational hurdles that are endemic to NYC’s first responder agencies. 
Another option would be to maintain the status quo in regards to the current 
strategy or lack thereof, and instead institute an apolitical and non-partisan NYC OEM 
with more power and authority to settle inter-agency disputes. The line of reasoning for 
this, it could be argued, is that spending scarce resources on being fully prepared for an 
RDD event is a strategy that plays right into the terrorist’s ploy of draining the budgets of 
Federal, State, and local governments. Since 9/11, each NYC first responder agency has 
enhanced their capabilities, increased their equipment, and developed their own plans to 
handle this type of attack. Perhaps this is all that one could reasonably expect from a 
jurisdiction like NYC with so much inherent risk. 
10. Conclusion 
It must be emphasized that the inputs needed to achieve the desired outcomes for 
RDD preparedness require only a relatively small capital investment. Also, at the heart of 
the matter is the need for “tipping point” leadership; the type that is willing to recognize 
that the entire problem is greater than the sum of its parts.171 In other words, present and 
future leaders must recognize that one integrated plan is generally more reliable than 
several plans separately executed by different agencies. 
The NPG suggests that every jurisdiction need not be equally prepared for all 
types of catastrophic events, but instead must focus on those types of attacks that are 
considered more likely to happen given the current threat and vulnerabilities.172 Experts 
believe that an RDD attack is the type of WMD attack most expected to occur. In terms 
of economic and psychological damage, a successful attack would be NYC’s equivalent 
of Hurricane Katrina but with far greater national implications. Given these parameters, 
NYC public safety officials must do all that is necessary to get ready for its inevitability. 
                                                 
171 Kim, Blue Ocean Strategy, 148. 
172 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, D-3. 
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B. PROBLEMS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to critically assess the preparedness of one 
specific local jurisdiction for one certain type of event, and from the viewpoint of one 
particular homeland security discipline. Given these constraints, it primarily addresses 
just a few noteworthy prevention and response issues, and offers recommendations that 
could potentially reduce casualties and save lives. However, any type of CBRN terrorist 
attack on a major U.S. city, including one involving a dirty bomb on NYC, would likely 
result in an extremely complex incident and create significant challenges from many 
different perspectives. The problems highlighted in this thesis should therefore be 
considered a starting point, and a framework for future research. 
In order for NYC, and other large cities, to be adequately prepared for an RDD 
attack, it is critical that they be able to fully recover from the adverse effects in its 
aftermath. Underscoring one of the more notable obstacles a community would encounter 
following a significant RDD event, the National Planning Scenarios finds that the 
process of decontamination and cleanup would be both lengthy and costly.173 Meanwhile, 
in apparent attempt to compensate for these remediation difficulties, recent guidance 
provided by DHS “would allow cleanup standards that in some cases would be far less 
stringent than what is required for Superfund sites, commercial nuclear power plants and 
nuclear waste dumps.”174 These competing objectives have prompted divergent opinions 
between government officials advocating less stringent standards and environmental 
watchdog groups calling for more restrictive federal requirements.175 Hence, local 
government officials and private sector entities, incorporating substantial citizen 
involvement, must carefully and deliberately develop RDD remediation strategies 
specifically designed for NYC. Not until these plans are solidified with pragmatic 
solutions to the aforementioned controversy will NYC achieve overall RDD 
preparedness. 
                                                 
173 Homeland Security Council, National Planning Scenarios, 11-5 – 11-6. 
174 H. Josef Hebert, “Government Has 'Dirty Bomb' Cleanup Guide,” SFGate.com, January 4, 2006, 
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2006/01/03/national/w155750S54.DTL (accessed February 9, 
2006). 
175 Hebert notes that the president of one watchdog group critical of the new guidelines accuses DHS 
of "proposing a nuclear Katrina, a formal policy of allowing the public to be exposed to massive radiation 
doses from a dirty bomb while the government does nothing to protect them." 
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The complexity of NYC, with its critical financial infrastructure, densely 
populated areas, and high threat level, demands that its first responders be sufficiently 
prepared for other types of catastrophic terrorist attacks as well. More specifically, NYC 
could benefit greatly from candid assessments of its preparedness for chemical, 
biological, and nuclear attacks. While some of the ideas explored and suggestions put 
forth in this thesis are largely applicable, the prevention and response measures unique to 
these other types of attacks pose additional challenges. For example, further critical 
analysis must be performed on NYC’s strategies for handling the capability-specific 
priorities of medical surge and mass prophylaxis; interoperable communications; CBRN 
detection, response, and decontamination; and information sharing and collaboration. 
Objective recommendations on how first responder agencies could best implement each 
one of these preparedness strategies in an integrated and coordinated fashion, will further 
enhance NYC’s level of readiness. 
It must be expected that a CBRN attack on NYC would result in a major multi-
agency response requiring the efforts of other key homeland security-related disciplines. 
Various local level organizations specializing in the fields of law enforcement, fire 
suppression, public health, emergency medical response, and emergency management all 
play important roles in the prevention, protection, response, and recovery aspects of 
preparedness. An in-depth appraisal of the CBRN policies and procedures currently in 
place for each one of these agencies would provide public safety officials with a broader 
and more comprehensive view of NYC’s overall ability to manage the risk presented by 
these catastrophic types of events. 
In many ways the vitality of NYC is positively correlated to the overall strength 
of the Nation; therefore, protecting against the dire consequences of major terrorist 
attacks must remain at the forefront of any preparedness goal. The astute 
recommendations provided by a wide variety of local experts could be used to develop 
collaborative strategies that would lessen the impact on the City and further fulfill the 
national mission. Thus, NYC’s public and private sector leaders should, on behalf of all 
their key stakeholders, encourage and support further research on each of the 
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